THE New Republic

Mud for President!

Gerald W. Johnson

Page 10

Politicians as Art Critics

By FRANK GETLEIN

If de Gaulle Follows de Gaulle

By JEAN DANIEL

What Is the Farm Problem . . . *Murray Benedict*

Conrad Aiken's Craft . . . . . *Irving Howe*

Nixon by Mazo . . . . . *Edward T. Folliard*

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JULY 27, 1959

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Washington Wire

The Old Order Dies

THE NEXT TWO WEEKS should give Vice President Nixon a fine springboard for his Presidential candidacy in Russia, but meanwhile our thoughts are here at home. We believe an old order is dying; a new one being born.

In the twilight of his Administration Eisenhower has gone almost wholly over to the Old Guard. We expect his next veto will be the TVA self-financing bill. This will make a clean-cut issue on public power. Eisenhower has called for self-financing legislation for TVA in each of his last four budgets, but whether he really wants it is hard to say. (He was for massive Federal aid to education, you remember, until Congress threatened to give it to him.) At any rate the Senate and House have now passed separate bills to allow TVA to issue $750 million in bonds. But Eisenhower adds a new condition; he wants the Budget Bureau to have a veto on such bonds, which neither Senate nor House bills provide.

We are philosophic about these vetoes because they help pave the way for the new order we expect in the 60's. (Frequently we hear it said that these vetoes show the two-term Amendment hasn't reduced the President's lame-duck power —see, Ike is more potent than ever! Nonsense. The "new" Eisenhower power is purely negative; he, like every President, has had it from the beginning. He is simply stuck on a sandbar while history rolls past.)

A deep flood of spiritual unemployment is piling up behind the Eisenhower negativism. It is going to find release in the 60's if the Democrats win and also, we think, if Rockefeller or even Nixon wins. The Democrats are the logical party to promote this process, but we agree with remarks attributed to Arthur Schlesinger Jr., that they can't do it just by sitting still.

What is perfectly evident is that in the 60's the budget must be raised as the nation's social responsibility increases. That is going to cost money, which means higher taxes. The Democratic leaders are trying to have their cake and eat it too: they are pointing to the nice things in the shop window and refusing to look at the price tags. Yes, these cakes are for sale, the price is fair, and we have the money. But will the Democrats try to pay the price by the hidden tax of inflation, or by the direct approach of balancing the budget (at a time of prosperity) at a higher level?

The evil of the Eisenhower $77 billion budget is not that he is trying to balance it but that it is outrageously low. Closing tax loopholes will raise part of the necessary funds. But for the accumulating and massive American needs of education, housing, highways, social security extension, health insurance and the like, more taxes are almost certainly going to be needed.

Steel's Strategy

FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS steel companies and steel unions have had a cozy arrangement whereby one put up wages, the other prices, and the whole cost was dumped on the consumer. When Estes Kefauver proposed permanent consumer fact-finding machinery, both sides spurned it indignantly. Now steel union chief David McDonald may feel differently. He made almost frantic last-minute concessions to prevent a strike. His final reduced demand was within the range of management savings from increased annual steel productivity (3 to 4 percent a year). The companies could have granted it without raising prices. Instead, management rather lamely shifted the basis of disagreement from wages to local work rules.

There is evidence that big steel thinks labor should be taught a lesson. It feels it has the ear of Eisenhower through ex-Treasury Secretary George Humphrey, head of National Steel, George Allen, bridge companion and a director of Republic Steel, and others. Many industries back steel. The awkward thing is that steel is making unprecedented profits. Second quarter earning reports will be record-breaking. If management were really fighting "inflation," as it says, it could cut prices. There is a likelihood that it has a different strategy. Let the strike go on a month or two (to take up over-production slack), then make a modest wage-boost settlement and blame the settlement for raising its own prices still higher. White House fact-finding would forestall this, but Eisenhower says "all the facts are known."

Bonus for the Banks

IT'S PROBABLY too complicated a matter to make completely clear, yet it's important enough to try, anyway. . . . Since 1917, commercial banks couldn't use the *cash* in their vaults as reserves against which to make loans. But now, under the little noticed Cash Vault "Bank Bonus" Bill, they will be allowed to. It means a release of $2.5 billion more reserves, with a possible sevenfold expansion of bank loans based on them. It means profits for the already profitable banks, and a big new inflation potential. The inflation-sensitive Administration makes no protest. The Reserve Board has devices to moderate the inflationary effect. These are complicated and involve selling securities that sop up the banks' lending power. The Reserve Board says it will use them. They involve transfer of securities from the government (and profits to the government) to the banks —with increased profits to the banks. It's a lovely thing for the banks, and you may be sure the Administration will guard their interests faithfully among all its vetoes of radical housing, rural electrification, TVA and similar legislation.

Notes

NEXT YEAR'S census will give the Administration a rich bag of patronage jobs in a Presidential election year; first time it's happened since 1940. . . . Leading Democrats are choosing up sides in the Paul Butler-Lyndon Johnson policy split: Governor Pat Brown (D, Calif.) came down on Butler's side in joining the Democratic Advisory Council — a big boost; the best Johnson forces could do was to trot out ex-Sen. Scott Lucas (D, Ill.), a has been.

T.R.B.

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THE WEEK 3

Out of Hand; $10 Billion Obsession; Newspapers and "News"; Black Dissenting; The Labor Bill; A Moderate Win; Rockefeller at Work

ARTICLES 10

The Superficial Aspect
by Gerald W. Johnson

Politicians as Art Critics
by Frank Getlein

If de Gaulle Follows de Gaulle
by Jean Daniel

The State of the Unions—V
by Warner Bloomberg, Jr., Joel Seidman, and Victor Hoffmann

What Makes the "Farm Problem"?
by Murray R. Benedict

BOOKS 26

MOVIES 30

RECORDS 31

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Correspondence

► *The Charge of McCarthyism*

SIRS:

THE letter from Mr. Paul Horan in *The New Republic* of July 6 seems to suggest that an anti-Furcolo vote in Massachusetts in 1954 was a pro-McCarthy vote and almost contends that Senator Kennedy's refusal to support

(Continued on page 32)

Out of Hand

THE PESSIMISTIC bulletins from Geneva on the foreign ministers' meetings as well as on test ban negotiations confirm the opinion of some that the US should promptly make our most modern atomic weapons available to NATO allies. And unless Congress acts immediately to forestall it, this is what will be done. Agreements go into effect this month, unless deferred or disapproved by the legislators, which are explicitly designed to enable countries not now having nuclear weapons to incorporate them into their military planning. There is a separate pact with each of seven NATO nations—similar pacts with others are expected to follow—and each stipulates that our government will provide the means for training in the use and maintenance of nuclear weapons. The agreements are not so much a turning point as a confirmation of a swift-moving and perhaps irresistible tide pulling us toward a world in which destructive capacity will have been raised to the ultimate.

But is the tide irresistible? Those who think not, and that the US should hesitate very long indeed before putting these weapons into other hands, are charged with being "unrealistic"; it is said that they would risk our security by robbing the West of its only practical means of compensating for the numerically superior Russian and Chinese Communist forces. But is "realism" so clearly on the side of the nuclear advocates? What of the risks of the line we have been following and along which these pacts would take us further? Are they so negligible?

The barriers to a reliable test ban agreement between the US and the USSR are visible enough after all the months of talks between the experts and the diplomats of both countries at Geneva. How much higher will those barriers be in another few years, as more and more nations have come to rely more and more on atomic firepower? If there is some present danger to posterity from radioactive fallout, what will that danger have become when a score of additional nations are able to blow up their own mushroom clouds?

Then, too, it would appear almost inevitable that as NATO's dependence on nuclear weapons increases, the West's ability to meet limited attacks by conventional responses will simultaneously decrease. And thus we are driven back to the terrible dilemma that although the West cannot afford to meet all aggression by massively retaliating, the weapons of that nuclear retaliation become nearly all that are left to us. In that sense, by its reliance on nuclear arms, the West disarms itself of means by which it might defend itself—say in "brushfire" situations—at a price it can pay, a price lower than near-annihilation.

Once these pacts go into effect, it will be hard to turn back. In fact, the agreement with West Germany has a peculiar provision, not contained in the one with our good neighbor Canada, that it can be terminated (as long as NATO lasts) only by consent of both parties. West Germany would thereby have a veto power over our diplomacy in the event a new Admin-

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istration should wish to use the possibility of a denuclearized zone in central Europe as a bargaining point.

It is not, of course, the stated intent of these pacts to spread nuclear weapons promiscuously. But as William C. Davidon, a physicist at Argonne National Laboratory, said earlier this month, "With more individuals capable of initiating a nuclear war, the danger of accidental war increases," and he points out that as more nations come to rely on a nuclear weapons system, each nation's motivation for acquiring nuclear warheads under its own control will be intensified. This motivation is further increased,

> by the provisions of the amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of July 3, 1958, which permit transfer of nuclear weapons and components to countries which have made substantial progress in nuclear weapons development.

Under the proposed pacts the US would keep control of warheads, but how much is this restriction worth? The growing importance of split-second timing in nuclear warfare will surely make such an arrangement impractical, requiring as it does formal transfer of the warheads from US custody in an emergency. And though Washington means to keep certain design "secrets" from our friends, experts in the NATO nations will be able to infer a great deal about the insides of any weapons we supply.

At the very least, it is incumbent on the Congress to take to heart Senator Humphrey's plea that it defer activation of the atomic-sharing pacts until there has been further study. Meanwhile, the most strenuous diplomatic initiative is needed to keep the atomic club as exclusive as possible, so that some chance will remain of abolishing the club altogether. With both the French and the Communist Chinese reported working to explode their own nuclear bombs within a relatively short time, the urgency of this diplomatic effort cannot be overstated.

Rather than further enlarging the nuclear weapons community, it would be less "risky" in our judgment for the Administration to take up Mr. Khrushchev's suggestion of last January that "a zone free from atomic weapons can and must be established in the Far East and the Pacific basin as a whole," linking this proposal to proposals for a similar zone throughout Europe.

$10 Billion Obsession

Two interesting news items, which deserve to be considered together, appeared in the press on the same day early this month. Both further illustrate the hasty, popular preference for whatever comes under the heading of "nuclear." In the first item, Dr. Herbert York, research chief of the Defense Department, was reported as having testified before a House Appropriations Subcommittee that the nuclear airplane has already cost about $1 billion, and that before the project is completed it will have cost at least $10 billion "or some multiple thereof." In the second item Andrei N. Tupolev, Soviet aircraft designer, stated that the turbo-prop Tu (Tupolev) 114, world's largest transport plane, which brought First Deputy Prime Minister Frol R. Kozlov to the US, would soon be available for sale to other countries if they wanted to buy it in lots of 50 or 100.

The hard push for the nuclear plane comes almost entirely from Congress, where certain members are obsessed with two ideas: (a) that if the Soviet Union were first to achieve such a plane it would be a military disaster for the US, and (b) that if the US first achieved it we would have another miracle weapon akin to the nuclear submarine. These views are consistent with the Congressional passion for whatever is *nuclear* in defense—regardless of cost. Witness the Senate Appropriations Committee's recent restoration of the attack carrier the Navy wants to lay down during the fiscal year, on condition that it be nuclear-propelled. Behind this passion there presumably lies a conviction that all uses of nuclear energy are decisively superior to alternative energy sources, and that exploitation of a presumed lead in nuclear technology is this country's best hope of staying ahead in the arms race. There must also be, however, a rather pathetic hope that by paying the extra price of nuclear energy for various military uses we may yet recover our lost position of unchallenged strategic power.

No one denies that the bill Dr. York estimates would be worth paying if the nuclear plane really can be expected to mean what its Congressional sponsors suppose it will mean. But what do the facts show?

The Air Force has rejected the idea that there is any inherent virtue in a nuclear plane that barely flies. Thus the current program is aimed at a nuclear-powered air vehicle that has real military utility. But no one has claimed that it will be a high-performance vehicle by even current standards — much less the standards of planes 5 to 10 years from now when the nuclear plane might actually be flying. Except for the single characteristic of sustained flight, the nuclear plane will almost certainly be a huge sub-sonic target should it come within range of the enemy's defenses. Recognizing this, the design concept for the plane calls for a "nomad" patrol craft, essentially an atmospheric missile-launching platform. We would have a number of these (at the total cost of how many billions, and when?) constantly cruising outside the range of Russian defenses and Russian radars, prepared to fire one or more ballistic missiles per plane at Russian targets on an instant's warning.

This concept, for which the code name is CAMEL (for "continuous airborne missile alert"), would add one more relatively invulnerable strategic weapons system to the Polaris submarine-fired system and to Minuteman, the dispersed or mobile ground-based solid-fuel ICBM, and thus would add to our security by reinforcing the strategic deterrent. But why wait for the nuclear plane, and why

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insist on paying so much for a system we can have much more cheaply. The B-52G, latest version of the big jet-bomber, is designed for armament with the Hound Dog air to surface cruise missile, and with the Bold Orion air-launched ballistic missile when the latter is ready. These planes are coming off the production line; they can be kept aloft with refueling as long as the crews can stand it —provided we also have the tankers to refuel them, and even at $8 million per plane we can have 1,200 of them for what Dr. York describes as the minimum investment before the first nuclear plane flies. Moreover, and much more to the point, we can have them starting now, when we need them to fill the "missile-gap," not 10 years hence.

Actually, we do not need a B-52G to launch the Hound Dog and Bold Orion; a much cheaper plane could do a better job. What is needed is a relatively inexpensive large platform, with room in which the crew can move around, because it is crew fatigue rather than fuel capacity that will limit the patrol periods of these planes. Such planes are readily available—they are the latest transports, preferably prop-jets rather than "pure" jets, because of the formers' greater economy in fuel consumption (and consequent less frequent need for air refueling). Assuming that the Soviet Tu-114 would not cost more than $5 million if bought in quantity, and might cost as little as half that, it would be a fine irony (though American plane manufacturers might not appreciate it) if we bought several hundred of them from the Russians and used them to mount an invulnerable attack system.

We do not suggest that research aimed at the nuclear plane should be terminated. There is always the possibility of technical breakthroughs that will make possible more meaningful concepts of military employment. Moreover, the Congressmen are right about the psychological impact of allowing the Russians to steal a march in this direction. But a modest sustaining project of forward research, with no preconception of what we are aiming for, seems to be what is needed now.

Newspapers and "News"

WHILE on the subject of defense, how "newsworthy" did the press find the 11,000-word pamphlet issued last month by the Democratic Advisory Council on *The Military Forces We Need and How To Get Them* —a study Walter Lippmann judged "much the best in its field" and on a theme Arthur Krock termed "the paramount issue of the times"?

The council had called for a $7.5 billion yearly increase in defense spending, mostly for missiles. It also recommended building up our conventional armed forces on the theory that in the race to close the "missile gap" we should not open up new gaps in the non-missile, non-nuclear field. The council warned that the "stage is being set for a major tragedy" if we don't get a better balance in defense planning.

At the time the report was released, both major wire services sent out stories that failed to get the main points into the important first part of their dispatches. They led with the cost angle but buried the major recommendations so deep that any newspaper that did not use more than six paragraphs left out the gist of the report. The *Boston Herald* ran a five-paragraph Associated Press item which mentioned only the cost and the names of leading council members. Yet readers of the *Herald* were comparatively fortunate, for all five other papers in Boston (excepting the *Christian Science Monitor*) omitted the story entirely. A check of 16 other large papers across the country showed that abbreviated and meaningless wire stories also were used in the *Washington Evening Star, Indianapolis Star, Los Angeles Times* and *San Francisco Chronicle.*

The Chicago Tribune ("The World's Greatest Newspaper") ran an article that took nearly three-quarters of a column, but only two paragraphs described the plan and its cost. The rest of the story dwelled on the Republican reaction, including the *Tribune*'s own observation that the council was "dominated by left-wing elements of the party." (This "Republican reaction," by the way, was interesting in itself. A group of Republican Senators issued their comments so promptly after the report's release that one could only conclude they had allowed themselves time only to scan a few of the 11,000 words. They termed the report "especially ill-advised, ill-conceived, ill-timed and irresponsible coming as it does during the tense climax of the Geneva conference.")

Even the *New York Times* carried only a half a column dispatch under a small headline on page 13, nearly half of which was about the GOP. Among the large papers which completely ignored the report in their editions of record were the *Chicago Daily News, Philadelphia Inquirer, Miami Herald, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, New York Herald Tribune, New York News,* and the *New York World Telegram and Sun.* Only half of the papers surveyed used the story, and only four of them gave the report's major points. Only two put the news on page one. And these 22 newspapers surveyed represent 16 percent of all the papers sold daily in the US.

Black Dissenting

TWO WEEKS before the Supreme Court closed up shop for the summer, Justice Hugo Black expressed a somber view of the tribunal on which he has served with such distinction for nearly 22 years. Dissenting in a right-to-counsel case, he wrote that "the Court once again retreats from what I conceive to be its highest duty, that of maintaining unimpaired the rights and liberties guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill

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of Rights." An indictment of this character from such a quarter cannot fail to be disquieting. Especially so when the indictment comes five scant years after the Court, in the *School Segregation Cases,* appeared finally and fully to have accepted its central role in articulating the values of a free society.

Plainly, however, Justice Black did not have in mind the *School Segregation Cases* or their progeny. For the Supreme Court's first action of the past term was to convene in extraordinary session last August and, in the face of Governor Faubus' subversion, reaffirm the Constitution to be the supreme law of the land, even in Little Rock.

WHAT, then, did Justice Black have in mind? There are four cases decided at this term to which he made explicit allusion. Each was a five-to-four decision: in each case Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and Brennan allied themselves with Justice Black.

The first was *Bartkus* v. *Illinois,* in which the Court permitted a state to try one already prosecuted for the same offense by the federal government. In sustaining the state conviction the Court followed substantial precedent—including a landmark Cardozo opinion (which Justice Black himself had joined, to his own later regret) holding that the ban on double jeopardy is not a necessary ingredient of due process of law. Where the Court principally went astray in *Bartkus* was in failing to give weight to the fact that the accused had actually been *acquitted* at his first trial.

The second case was *Frank* v. *Maryland,* in which the Court sustained a fine imposed on a homeowner who would not permit a state health inspector, lacking a warrant, to enter his home in search of rats. The Court conceded that due process of law embraces the concept of freedom from unreasonable search. It refused, however, to require a warrant as a precondition of a search so clearly not calculated to ferret out evidence of crime. But the Court's distinction is not wholly satisfying. The law-abiding are also entitled to have their privacy protected—especially at the slight cost of making an inspector persuade a magistrate with power to issue warrants that there is probably cause for a search.

The third case was *Barenblatt* v. *United States,* sustaining the contempt conviction of a former Vassar faculty member who refused to answer the Un-American Activities Committee's questions on Communist Party membership. Here, the Court unquestionably did withdraw a long way from the high ground taken in the *Watkins* case two years ago, where a majority of the Justices had manifested grave doubts about the undefined investigative mandate which the House of Representatives so carelessly confided to its notoriously irresponsible committee.

Fourth and last of the cases cited by Justice Black was *Uphaus* v. *Wyman,* where the Court sustained the contempt conviction of the director of an adult camp in New Hampshire who had refused to divulge to the state attorney-general—charged by the state legislature with finding "subversive persons"—the names of the camp's speakers, guests and employees. The Court, in dignifying this comic-opera probe of Reds in the White Mountains, certainly retreated from its erstwhile realism that the search for the seditious is a national problem rather than a local pastime. *Uphaus,* like *Barenblatt,* disturbingly suggests undue sensitivity on the part of some of the Justices to Congressional attacks on earlier, and bolder, Court actions.

In sum, the decisions most upsetting to Justice Black are not ones from which one can draw comfort. Yet, he was writing two weeks before adjournment, and his verdict was, therefore, in the nature of an interim report. Subsequently, on June 29, the day the Court began its summer recess, a majority of the Justices, in two important instances, made quite plain their dedication to what Justice Black had referred to as the Court's "highest duty."

In *Kingsley* v. *Regents* the Court considered the New York ban on the film version of *Lady Chatterley's Lover* and concluded that the Lady's not for burning. Moreover, it came as something of a surprise that all nine Justices joined in the judgment, albeit six different opinions were filed in explanation of the Justices' several rationales. The prevailing opinion was written by the Court's newest member, Potter Stewart, and was concurred in by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan.

In a second opinion, *Greene* v. *McElroy,* the Court set aside a denial of security clearance—and resultant firing—of an engineer working for a government contractor. The decision is a body-blow to the industrial security program through which the federal government certifies the purity of some three million employees of private firms. It is a decision that is perhaps the most important of the judicial year—saving only that in the Little Rock case. By a vote of eight-to-one the Court held that the government's denial of a clearance to Greene was invalid because the security board considered accusatory statements by anonymous informants whom Greene had no opportunity to identify, confront and cross-examine. The eight Justices found no authority—Congressional or Presidential—for this departure from accepted Anglo-American procedural requirements. Five of the eight—Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan and Stewart—went further and expressed their feeling that the requirements were "fundamental"—that for Congress or the President deliberately to authorize a program failing to provide for confrontation might trespass on constitutional limitations. And the dictum of course has comparable implications for the government's loyalty program for government employees.

These major decisions on the Court's closing day suggest, happily, that Justice Black may have sounded too

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melancholy a note two weeks before and that, somewhat uncertainly, the Court continues to steer its middle course. The two decisions of June 29 are of interest for another reason. In both of them, Justice Stewart joined the almost inseparable civil libertarian quartet: Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan. Whether this alliance will recur is one of the interesting questions about which we shall learn more when the Court reconvenes in October.

The Labor Bill

THE AFL-CIO leadership will decline to say so, but organized labor's friends in the House of Representatives last week did the labor movement a good turn. They may not be blessed for it by George Meany (whose position as head of a loose coalition of power enclaves requires him to bristle at any mention of regulatory legislation) or by the NAM (which would prefer no legislation to that which calls for less than labor's unconditional surrender).

Six weeks ago, the Republican Minority Leader, Mr. Halleck, let it be known that no labor reform measure would get through this session. The wish may have been father to the prediction, but his opinion was echoed by some astute journalists. The House Labor Committee did, however, produce a bill last week which has the distinction of having been written by the Committee itself, and of being very much better not only than the extreme measures demanded by labor's enemies but an improvement over the more ambiguous and more punitive Senate bill. It deserves approval by the whole House and by the Senate. For this accomplishment, such liberal Democrats as Stewart Udall (Ariz.), Frank Thompson (N.J.), Edith Green (Oreg.), Carl Elliot (Ala.), and Republican Robert P. Griffin (Mich.) deserve praise.

The farcical non-Communist affidavit for employers in the Senate bill has been deleted; instead proven Communists are barred from holding union office. A loophole in the Taft-Hartley Act has been closed: the House Committee would permit employees on strike to vote in NLRB elections. Common-law rights of union members to an accounting of how dues are spent have been spelled out. Fundamental membership rights have been clarified, and in so doing the Labor Committee has recognized that so long as there is a closed shop, unions—unlike other self-governing voluntary associations—are tinged with the "public interest" and must be held accountable to the community in a special way.

But has the House Committee written a prescription for what ails the patients—the patients being both the community and those union members victimized by venal, undemocratic or manhandling officials? Certainly it has produced no sure-cure, but then high-mindedness and respect for democratic procedures in unions, as elsewhere, can only be partially encouraged by legislation. Still, Mr. Hoffa has reason to dislike what has been done. If the bill passes, no convicted felon may hold union office within five years after his conviction, which could have some effect on the Teamster hierarchy. The bill's outlawing of contractual agreements between unions and management permitting the union to carry struck "hot cargo" will also hurt Mr. Hoffa. Considerable Teamster authority, not only over local businesses but over other local unions, has derived from the Teamsters' power to break or make strikes of other unions by carrying or not carrying struck merchandise. The effect of this section is to isolate the Teamsters more completely.

And in the longer-run, Teamster members themselves may benefit from those parts of the House bill which detail rights of members to regular election, to fair nominating procedures, to secret ballots and an honest count of those ballots. They may still vote for Jimmy Hoffa, but, if the whole Congress now acts as responsibly as has the House Labor Committee, they will have new and safer opportunities to register a contrary preference.

A Moderate Win

THE BACKING away from "massive resistance" to public school desegregation, executed by Virginia's Governor J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., and the General Assembly earlier this year and ratified last week by the electorate in a Democratic primary, suggests that when moderates can establish themselves as defenders of embattled public schools rather than as "integrationists," and when the segregationist extremists can be labelled "school-closers," moderate Southerners can fight boldly and with a fair chance of success.

Though the margin of support for Almond's program in the legislature remains narrow, the manner in which the Virginia primary took shape makes it an impressive victory for Southern sanity. Most of the segregationist candidates who sought to unseat moderate incumbents were defeated. Of greatest interest was the battle for the State Senate, where the election of two additional "massive resisters" could have restored that body to extremist control. The key contest was in the city of Alexandria where a highly organized effort was made to unseat state Senator Armistead Boothe, considered one of the most liberal members of the upper chamber. A record-breaking number of Alexandrians went to the polls; most observers predicted a close vote. But when it was all over the incumbent had received 5,413 votes to 2,921 for his opponent. (The opponent was zealously supported by a brother-in-law of state Sen. Harry Byrd, Jr.)

In the neighboring 29th district of Virginia, which is largely rural and has a higher percentage of Negroes in its population, the pattern was similar. State Senator

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Blake T. Newton, who had been ousted as president of the State Board of Education by former Governor Stanley because of his liberal views on the race question was fiercely opposed by a "100 percent segregationist," John Gelleher. Newton was renominated by a vote of 6,192 to 3,580.

In Richmond, three moderate Senators won with heavy majorities: the massive resistance candidate ran a poor fifth. A Negro who ran unsuccessfully for the House of Delegates in Richmond received 10,975 votes. In southeastern Virginia, two massive resistance Senators were beaten.

All in all, the Virginia primary underlined the new opportunities offered responsible Southern leaders when the issue becomes one of preserving the public school system. The results should help stiffen the backbones of "silent moderates" all across the South.

Rockefeller at Work

WHILE DEMOCRATS hold their breath and most Republicans withhold judgment, the no-campaign campaign of Nelson Rockefeller profits by nothing more than the Governor's diligently doing his homework. For one thing, come what may, no one is going to be able to ask whether Mr. Rockefeller is "clean as a hound's tooth." He has instituted, without question, the strictest code for official conduct ever remembered in Albany.

True, he has little reason to be tempted by offers of a heifer or a putting green for his ranch in Venezuela; still, he has dutifully returned all gifts sent him as Governor. (He reversed the family tradition and sent back a dime given him by some school children.) No one in his official family may accept free passes to a prize fight or the races. Even the state's boxing commissioner sat in a "paid-for" seat at the Patterson-Johansson bout. And when the state's harness racing czar was accused of accepting free meals and drinks from track operators, Mr. Rockefeller summoned the lawmakers into special session and got what he asked for—the commissioner's job.

He won reluctant support from his own party majority in the Legislature for tax increases and a long-overdue withholding system for paying them. He has created 28 special task forces to study major state problems (two reports are in: one proposing a giant, new middle income housing program and the other outlining a new and not altogether popular concept in civil defense.)

As the political drumbeats grow louder, Mr. Rockefeller keeps the appearance of a man who has taken on this job of Governor as though it were his first and only opportunity to make good. He is eager, restlessly energetic, sometimes impulsive, sometimes cautious, and gives the impression of enjoying what he is doing as well as knowing where he is going.

A COMMUNICATION

Myths About Soviet Military Intentions

SIRS:

AT THIS MOMENT, Western policy seems to be based on three propositions: First, that there is no evidence of a change in the basic aims of the Soviet regime; second, that these aims involve a revolutionary expansionist drive which of its nature can have no limits; third, that the Soviets are ready to expand by all-out war at any time, unless deterred by superior destructive forces, and that therefore we face a desperate race in which dispersed bases all around Russia (at least during the period of the so-called "missile gap"), nuclear armament of West Germany, and so on, are essential to our survival. Louis Halle does well to call for a reexamination of these concepts and I am in sympathy with much of the argument in his *New Republic* article of June 22. I differ with him, however, on certain points of principle.

Let me begin with an unfashionable assertion. Even under Stalin, the Soviet regime did not base its foreign policy on winning a major conflict which it would start. Stalin did his utmost to avoid war with Germany. His conquests in Central Europe were the direct consequence of that war, or, like the take-over of the Baltic states, were both made possible and made strategically explicable by it. Korea, as some of the most fervent anti-Communist critics now recognize, was an error and not a guide to normal policy; the Soviet Government misread the signs, and thought that it would be a completely safe walk-over. Thus there is a sense in which the orthodox proposition is right: there has indeed been no fundamental change since Stalin's death in respect to the imminence of the Soviet military threat, because, in the sense in which it is popularly imagined, that threat did not exist in 1952 any more than it does in 1959. Social changes *are* occurring inside the Soviet Union, but the *simpliste* argument that Stalin wanted war or aimed at military conquest while Khrushchev is for "peace" is untenable, though not quite for the reasons commonly adduced.

This does not mean that there is never any danger of war, or that the West's defense measures were or are unnecessary. Stalin, and no doubt Khrushchev too, would not be against expansion without risk—expansion under circumstances which existed in Lithuania in 1940, and were thought to exist in Korea in 1950. Excessive weakness is excessive temptation, and this is the justification for NATO. But we had gone far beyond this stage even before Stalin's death. It is often argued, with perfect truth, that danger would threaten us if we took no precautions, but this is hardly a sufficient reply. It is as if we started from the correct assumption that a burglar would walk in if we left

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the door unlocked, and used this to justify not merely locking the door but having a heavy gun trained day and night on the burglar's wife and children.

Another point frequently made concerns the so-called "unchanged aims" of the Soviet regime, and here I tend to disagree with Mr. Halle's logic, though I largely agree with his practical conclusions. The Soviet Union can no more change its aims than the Catholic Church can deny its fundamental doctrines. But what can and does alter is the nature of the action taken, and the risks run, in pursuit of the formally unchanged aims. The Catholic Church would still like to liquidate heresy, and Khrushchev would certainly like to see a further spread of Communism. But it simply does not follow that Khrushchev gives top priority to expansionism or is spending all his waking hours plotting an attack on the West.

Unlike Hitler, he has an optimistic ideology, and there is more substance to his optimism than Mr. Halle allows. It is true that the West has remained politically and socially firmer than the Communists expected, but it is part of Communist theology that the West's fatal contradictions are only postponed, and in any case the situation in Asia and Africa must appear to Khrushchev to be working out to the disadvantage of the West and to the advantage of Communism.

THE SOVIET challenge of "peaceful co-existence" is not proof of any change in aims. It may represent simply a belief that a cautious and defensive military attitude is in fact the best means of assuring long-term success. However, it is also true that there are in the Soviet hierarchy an increasing number of influential persons who do not care about ideology. And they must be expected to use the above argument to justify, in terms of the ruling ideology, the more cautious policy of non-revolutionary nationalism to which they naturally incline. The social evolution of the USSR has brought many individuals of this cast of mind closer to the seats of authority, and the fact that Khrushchev is not one of them (or even opposes them) should not blind us to this.

Indeed, as Mr. Halle says, the practical policies pursued by Russia are consistent with traditional nationalism. Over and over again, for instance on Germany, the Middle East, US bases in Persia, etc., Soviet policy follows lines which would have been approved by their Tsarist predecessors and doubtless corresponds to the technical and unideological advice of their professional diplomats. At present the practical action which can be taken to further Soviet ideology happens to coincide fairly closely with the nationalist line, but it need not always be so. It is in the West's interests that the Russian nationalists should not support Khrushchev, but this is hardly possible in the face of the West's unimaginative, negative policy, with its emphasis on ringing Russia with rocket bases and supporting and arming any enemy of the USSR. This policy delays and obstructs the emergence of independent or oppositionist tendencies within Russia and fills the liberal spirits in Poland with despair at our short-sightedness.

Our errors, in my view, are fundamentally connected with the obsession with the myth of a clear and present military danger. Some West European observers of American policy shrug their shoulders when they see American reactions which they know to be nonsensical, such as, for instance, the response to the cutting of ocean cables by trawlers or the exaggerated precautions against "Pearl Harbor" taken by the US Air Force; they argue that although such a fuss is unnecessary, it is a price which must be paid for the maintenance of Western unity and for persuading Senators to vote foreign aid programs, as both these things are alleged to depend on a feeling of imminent peril.

These unreasonable reactions are symptomatic of a state of mind which cannot possibly make intelligent decisions. It is comforting but illogical to blame the Generals; they do their professional duty in the light of the political assessments which they receive, and it is not their fault if these assessments are based on a myth about Soviet military intentions. It is this myth which is largely responsible for the frozen immobility of foreign policy, though of course it would be absurd not to see that the Soviet side bears its share of responsibility for the present situation, and that Soviet leaders suffer from their own delusions and myths about Western policies and intentions.

It should be added that mental clarity in the West is not helped by the ingrained habit of double-thinking on the part of many who should know better. Quite often one meets serious people who suppose it to be self-evident that to fly American military aircraft off the Soviet coast is perfectly legitimate, but that similar Soviet action off the American coast is outrageous provocation calling for violent measures; or that for the West to sell arms to Middle Eastern countries is perfectly proper, while for the Russians to do so is clear proof of their immoral desire to conquer the world. It is by no means obvious why any neutral, let alone any Russian, could accept such a logic as this.

It is hardly necessary to emphasize that the views here expressed are consistent with a reasonable level of military precautions, nor do they constitute a denial of the existence of a dangerous Soviet challenge. Khrushchev appears to be seeking a *modus vivendi* which would minimize the risk of war, while providing an opportunity for the defeat of the West by the "forces of history," which he regards as inevitable. He naturally hopes to extract the maximum advantage from incidental horse-trading, and is not averse to trying to help the forces of history along by economic or propaganda campaigns. However, we spend far more than the USSR on political and military aid, and it is not for want of trying that our propaganda is not as effective as it should be, so that it ill behooves us to take up a high moral attitude and to accuse the Soviets of failing to observe the rules of the game. Nor is there any need for a defeatist pessimism. Surely we do not believe that we are doomed by the forces of history, and we have ample opportunity to prove this.

ALEC NOVE

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The Superficial Aspect

Mud for President!

HAVING HAD no personal contact whatever with the Hon. Paul M. Butler, and judging him entirely by what is printed for everybody to read in the newspapers, I had judged him to be a somewhat rash and more than slightly arrogant politician.

Recent events have modified that opinion only to the extent of adding one other quality. This baby is tough. When the paternal Rayburn, the majestic Johnson, and the ancient Green all opened on him with artillery, I expected him to vanish more completely than the Cheshire cat, leaving not even a grin behind.

Instead, he has turned loose another salvo, and more than that he has hit them between wind and water. A great many Democrats do believe that the Texas leadership is throwing away the election of 1960 and some believe that they are doing it willfully and knowingly, because they don't want a Democrat in the White House.

Why should they? The present set-up is perfect from the standpoint of Rayburn and Johnson. With a Democratic President they would have to take orders, or at least appear to be taking them. But with a Republican President and a Democratic Congress they are independent; and who, having enjoyed independence, cares to return to his previous condition of servitude?

But Rayburn and Johnson are obviously attempting to set the clock back. They would return to conditions existing before 1828, when the party—any party—consisted of its members in Congress and Presidential candidates were nominated, not by national conventions, but by King Caucus. Butler says it won't work, and a superficial observer is inclined to think that in this case Butler is right. Maybe he is rash. Maybe he is arrogant. But what of that, if he is telling the truth?

This much is certain—if Sam Rayburn and Lyndon Johnson, plus Eastland and Byrd and Faubus' hand-picked member of the House, are the Democratic Party, then a great many of us who voted for Stevenson are not Democrats. Butler looks at it the other way. He holds that the people who voted for Stevenson are the Democratic Party, and the representatives of oil and segregation are not. Maybe they will not have to fight this out. Maybe they can argue it out; but Henry Clay couldn't, and as an argufier he is generally considered about the top. At the polls in 1828 King Caucus was knocked for a row of fence-posts, and in 1832 even the Whigs resorted to a national convention, as all parties have done since.

A fight, of course, will mean the election of Richard M. Nixon, probably with Republican control of Congress even more effective than it is now, for the defeated segment of the Democrats will frankly go over to the opposition, or form a third party. An argument would be less disastrous, although it would probably be merely a postponement of the fight.

There is, of course, one consideration that causes disengaged observers to view the possibility of a fight with less alarm than they would otherwise feel, but it is a consideration that no one cares to proclaim in a loud voice. It is a thing to be mentioned only in whispers. This is the possibility that Eisenhower prosperity may be as fraudulent as was the Coolidge prosperity of 1928. There are some indications that this may be the case. At this moment it is said that there are 12.5 million suckers playing the stock market. Export trade is withering. Wages are going up and up, but the money buys less and less. Farmers are kept alive and working only by ruinous subsidies. All of which sounds much like conditions in 1928.

Most of the pundits, though, seem to think that the system will hang together through 1960. If they are right, then the President inaugurated in 1961 will be where Hoover was in 1929, where Cleveland was in 1893, and where Van Buren was in 1837. If that President is Mr. Nixon, those who never liked Mr. Nixon anyhow will find a certain grim consolation in the outcome; for regardless of how the President may sign his checks, his name will be Mud.

THIS suggests the interesting possibility that to throw the election in 1960 may be the best service that politicians could render to the Democratic Party. If a crash is inevitable, it will be smart politics to let a Republican President catch it.

But to assume that a crash is inevitable is bankrupt statecraft. Governments are instituted among men to secure to them the rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, none of which are secure when the smokestacks are smokeless and the apple-venders go about the streets. Governments that can't govern, or won't govern, with a modicum of wisdom become destructive of the inalienable rights, and it is the right of the people to alter or abolish them. If the Democratic Party admits that it can do no better than the Republican, there is no point in holding an election. But if it claims that it can do better, then, like the colored parson of tradition, it should "show wharin."

GERALD W. JOHNSON

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Politicians as Art Critics

Thoughts on the US Exhibition in Moscow

by **FRANK GETLEIN**

IT IS A fundamental rule in the American art world that when a non-artist professional—museum director, exhibition man, writer, for that matter—does the best he possibly can and produces a first-rate result, he immediately gets kicked in the head by his employers. The reason for this is that most of the professionals are employed by amateurs who don't know anything about art but do know what they like, or, in many cases, have wives who tell them what they like. This basic operating principle of our art establishment is behind the continuing game of musical chairs in American art museum directorships. The professionals keep leaving in the stubborn belief that eventually they'll find trustees who believe in the value of art itself, rather than as a step up the social ladder or a fitting background for a certain income bracket. The amateurs keep firing the pros in the belief that eventually they'll find directors who really know the field but at the same time have no convictions. In general, both beliefs are deluded, but they do keep the arts lively. The publishers of *Who's Who in American Art* could probably make money on a monthly supplement, *Who's Where.*

For this reason I find myself less appalled than most at recent developments in the American art exhibition just opened at Sokolniki Park in Moscow. It's par for the course, as they say at Burning Tree. If the object of the show is to give a full picture of art in America, then a vital note was added when Representative Walter rumbled and Mr. Eisenhower rambled.

Ike's protest is the more American of the two, reaching out, as he does in so many things, to the grass roots and the green corn of the nation: the next committee of selection will have "one or two people that, like most of us here (where, the White House? Burning Tree?) are not too certain exactly what art is, but . . . know what we like and what America likes." The modest disclaimer of competence linked astonishingly with the assertion of authority is right in the central tradition.

The President's objection to a specific painting in the Moscow show carries, again, as his reactions often do, a glittering little constellation of ironies. The painting is Jack Levine's "Welcome Home," which the President, who probably hasn't seen it, characterized as "lampoon more than art." The subject is a well-fed General feeding himself some more at a banquet honoring his return. "Lampoon" implies a specific, personal object and if the President sees in the slightly porcine figure the features and form of one of his old buddies, then he's one up on Levine, who regards the subject as Generals in general. The bored, frozen woman at the General's right may bear a very slight resemblance to Mrs. Eisenhower, but only a hyper-sensitive former General could see it. The likeness is not nearly as close as it is in the President's lady of Levine's "Inauguration."

What Ike probably means by "lampoon" is that the painting does not accept Generals at their star value but looks at them as human beings and in this respect finds at least one of them somewhat less than fully human. This attitude toward Generals is obviously not calculated to please Generals, but it is a traditional American attitude and one which ought always to be revived for it is always in danger of suppression. As an item in an American exhibition in Moscow, the painting has special value, for it demonstrates superbly the American inclination to distrust people with power. I've seen a good number of Soviet paintings of Red Army Generals and there isn't a stroke of disrespect in the lot. Soviet painters love those Generals; this, presumably, is the attitude Eisenhower would like to see American artists acquire.

Finally, the picture, like most of Levine's work, is beautifully painted. Last summer in Mexico City it won the highest award given a United States painting in a big inter-American exhibition. It is definitely one of the works in the show that will win the respect of Russian artists on technical grounds. The artist has set himself the task of measuring up to the old masters in technical ability, with Rubens and Rembrandt as particular examples. His content is the examination of the American environment, with a personal bias for the unlovely aspects, for exploiters of all kinds, for the self-created ridicule of pomp and circumstance. Again, this bias is a firmly established part of the American tradition. Specifically in painting this cold eye cast on the American scene is responsible for a vast body of work in the 20th

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FRANK GETLEIN, New Republic *art critic, visits the Soviet Union this summer and will report further on art for Communists and Communism in art.*

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Century, from The Eight at the beginning of the century to Shahn, Cadmus, Evergood and Levine himself.

Representative Walter also speaks for tradition, but his tradition is a much briefer one, though not as brief as many suppose. It had its supreme moment in the activities of Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy, but it goes back to the thirties with Hamilton Fish and Martin Dies. Walter, promising a Congressional investigation of the show, has announced that half of the 67 artists represented "have records of affiliation with Communist fronts or causes." He demanded that works by those artists be removed from the exhibition. USIA, which is responsible for the exhibition, has not removed the works, but it has added a group of 18th and 19th Century paintings. These should offend no one, but the addition isn't going to please anyone, either: art professionals will regard the addition as a sop to the forces of darkness, while the forces of darkness will correctly regard the addition as an evasion of the issue.

Walter's predecessor in the field of terrorizing American art was Rep. George A. Dondero from, of all places, Royal Oak, Michigan. Dondero retired a couple of years ago after doing important harm to the USIA program of art exchange. It was hoped that art would be allowed to heal its wounds and that the program would gradually regain the respectability and even distinction it had attained before Dondero struck. The show prepared for Moscow was the first major indication that such had indeed happened, that the USIA was once more in a position to engage top professionals, to do a first class, all-out job and damn the torpedoes. Walter's announcement, especially the fancy footwork phrasing—"affiliation," "fronts" and "causes" are all vague and perjorative rather than specific accusations and right in the old Dondero style—indicate that Walter has taken over Dondero's files, his endless extensions of remarks in the *Congressional Record* and very likely both the sources of information and the mailing list that spread the Michigan Congressman's phrases all over the country.

Q. MRS. MAY CRAIG, *Portland Press Herald:* Mr. President, the House Un-American Activities opened a hearing this morning on the type of art that we are sending to the American Exhibit in Moscow. . . . One picture, for instance, depicts an American General in the most unflattering way. . . . Would you review our presentation there to make sure that it truly represents Americans to the Russians?

THE PRESIDENT: This one of which you speak . . . looks like a lampoon more than art, as far as I am concerned. But I am not going . . . to be the censor myself for the art that has already gone there. Now I think I might have something to say if we have another exhibition anywhere, to the responsible officials of the methods they produce, or get the juries and possibly there ought to be one or two people that, like most of us here, say we are not too certain exactly what art is but we know what we like, and what America likes—what America likes is after all some of the things that ought to be shown.

—*White House Press Conference, July 1, 1959.*

THE Dondero operation was a beautiful one in many ways. The Congressman's own account of it led one to the conclusion that Dondero was being played for a Patsy in truly classical style. He was single-handedly responsible for the scrapping of two of the most important art exhibitions ever mounted by USIA for overseas use. These were "One Hundred Americans" and "Sport in Art." The latter is better known because it was underwritten by Time, Inc. and was touring the country before being sent to the 1956 Olympics at Melbourne when Dondero struck. On the floor of the House—or in extensions of remarks—Dondero said that both shows contained work by Communist artists. Copies of his speeches were mailed by the thousands. Before the "Sport" show reached Dallas, Tex., the Dallas County Patriotic Council protested. The local museum installed the show anyway and the council protested to USIA. The then head of USIA, Theodore V. Streibert, went to the organization which had assembled the exhibitions, the American Federation of Arts, and requested the withdrawal of works by 12 of the "One Hundred Americans" and by four of the "Sports" painters. AFA refused even to hear the names of the painters, said all the work had been selected on the basis of the respective formats and on the basis of quality and that AFA would not be part of the character assassination of American artists. Both shows were withdrawn and USIA went into a period of playing it safe in export exhibitions.

All of this was Dondero's finest hour. Two things happened then in rapid succession that were independent of Dondero's crippling of USIA's art program but that had the attractive look of having been machined to fit the situation created by the Communism-in-Art issue. In the first place, Abstract Expressionism came to full flower in an art that no one could connect with politics of any kind, produced by artists who were mostly disinterested in any politics but those of galleries, museums and art magazines; in the second place, the International Council of the Museum of Modern Art took up the slack created by the weakening of USIA's efforts, and the Council's main efforts, in South America and Europe, have been devoted to spreading the gospel of the new—politically antiseptic—American painting.

This two-pronged development is particularly suitable in view of Dondero's fears of what he regarded as the "Communist conspiracy in art" and the way in which he believed the conspiracy functioned. I interviewed Dondero in 1956, a personal note I throw in to lend credibility to a statement any reasonable reader would suppose

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a writer had clearly made up out of his head.

The Congressman told me that the long-range objective of the Communists was to support what he called "modern art," a term that apparently embraced everything from Van Gogh on up. He said that the ultimate effect of nonrepresentational and abstract art will be to "addle the brains of decent, innocent Americans." When our brains have been well addled, "the Soviets, either by internal subversion or by simply landing an army in New York, will be able to take over the country without a shot being fired."

Did an American Congressman actually say that? So help me, he did.

If Walter takes up the fight to save those brains from addling, a new investigation could conceivably do some good. Some few ground rules for inquisitors have been developing in the last few years of Congressional investigations. If these rules have reached the point at which sources of Congressional information may be demanded by those accused, Walter's promised investigation just might reveal who was gulling Dondero, who was picking up the check for the substantial expenses of his total operation, and who stood to profit from the vague discrediting of most of the leading American artists and art institutions of our century.

For it was Dondero's boast that neither his investigations nor the mass mailings of his remarks had, as he put it, "cost the government one penny." In 1948, said Dondero, "Howard Chandler Christy and a group of his fellow artists . . . made a special trip to Washington from New York. I was shocked at what I learned from them." Not shocked enough, apparently, to check the information, not shocked enough to make a single criminal accusation that could be tried at law, only shocked enough to maunder on for eight years about "fronts," "associations," "causes" and "conspiracies." Dondero withheld the names of his sources, the people who presumably paid for any presumed "investigations," but they were all artists who "do the art for our government buildings," including more sculptors than painters. The same artists, he said, paid "out of their own pockets" for the printing and mailing of Dondero's libel-immune extensions of remarks listing, at one time or another, a substantial majority of American artists and museums of the first rank as being involved in the Communist conspiracy. In addition to Christy, Dondero named Walter S. Steele as one helpful in handing the Congressman the inside dope and then dope peddling with reprints. Steele was the editor and general manager of the *National Republic*, a "magazine of fundamental Americanism."

If you can tell a hawk from a handsaw, you can figure out that the painting and sculpture adorning our government buildings is mostly far below the level of the best American art of our time; that the money spent on government art—though far from what is legally permissible—is still a sizable amount; and that the people getting that money naturally benefit from a situation in which most authentic American artists are suspect. If Walter does mount his investigation and it gets just a little bit out of hand we may learn that there is indeed a conspiracy in American art and that its nexus is not Communism but cash, its working members not artists as Communists but artists as businessmen.

"Ah, Yes—We Have Many Things in Common"

Meanwhile, back in Moscow, it is gratifying to report that the exhibition that has apparently brought on a new time of troubles for American art is a fine show. As noted, the last Congressional foray against American art turned the field over to the International Council of the Museum of Modern Art. The council's biggest show, in addition to a Jackson Pollock retrospective, has been "The New American Painting," which is now back at its home base in New York for the summer. Last year's American show at Brussels was of American painters under 35, an idiotic notion for an exhibition in such a place until you reflect that painters under 35 are unlikely to have been contributing $10 to any milk fund for Loyalist children in the Spanish Civil War. The impression given Europeans by all three of these major exhibitions, of course, was that Americans are doing nothing but drip, splatter and splash, rather like some breakfast cereal. The Moscow show establishes perspective for 20th Century American art. The show would be an event of distinction in any American art museum and it is

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greatly to be regretted that the 49 paintings and 23 sculptures will not be shown in Europe after the Moscow exhibition. Europeans might or might not like American art, but for the first time since Dondero the Moscow exhibition offers a well-rounded look at what that art has been over the last 40 years.

USIA in the first place asked a respectable organization to set up the show. This is important and is the first thing destroyed by the Dondero-Walter approach. Respectable organizations, as the AFA demonstrated, will not work under the conditions necessary to appease Congressmen boastful of their ignorance and insistent on their authority. The organization was the Archives of American Art, a Detroit based group closely associated with the Institute there. The Archives chose the men to choose the show: Lloyd Goodrich, director of the Whitney; Henry Hope, art department chairman at Indiana University; Theodore Roszak, the sculptor and Franklin Watkins, the painter. Again, a respectable group which would not work within the demeaning limits imposed by Donderoism and what is about to be Walterism. If the government assumes, as it does, that the exhibition of American art overseas is in some way helpful to the general effort of explaining America to the world, this is the kind of organization, these are the kind of professionals needed. Their services are available, but they don't have to work under conditions established by Walter.

IN REGARD to abstract expressionism, the Moscow show restores a balance that has been completely absent. The new painters are seen again as a cloud little bigger than a man's hand in a large panorama of contemporary American art. All the big names of the big canvases are present, Pollock, Motherwell, Guston, Rothko, De Kooning, but for once they are simply present, artists like others but not the only artists. The exhibition also clearly shows that that whole movement is a deviation from the mainstream of American painting. The main focus has been, with wide variations, the one mentioned above in connection with Jack Levine, the patient, searching examination of the American reality. This began with the Ashcan Painters, who, for the first time, began painting the urban reality around them and opening everyone's eyes to the beauty and pathos of the streets. Fundamentally this is the same impulse that motivated the painters of the American Scene in the thirties. Incidentally, the freedom of the United States artist is well attested by Grant Wood's "Parson Weems' Fable," humorously attacking the Father of Our Country in the cherry tree legend.

At the time the American cubism of the twenties seemed an abrupt departure from the realism of Sloan and Glackens. In the Moscow show it can be seen—in chill works by Sheeler and Demuth—to be doing the same thing with different means. The focus is still the world around us. The reduction of geometric forms in industrial and agricultural buildings to geometric forms in paint doesn't destroy the world or even try to; rather, the world is revealed anew, which is also the aim of the older painters.

Occasionally the choice is perfect: Watkins' own portrait of Thomas R. White is certainly one of his finest works and is also a character study of the American businessman that avoids the clichés of both the Soviet academy and the Congressional academy. Peter Bloom's "Eternal City" is anti-Fascist enough for anyone, with its great head of Mussolini snarling out from the jack-in-the box among the ruins of Rome. O'Keeffe's "Ram's Head, White Hollyhock and Little Hills" composes these Southwestern objects into a haunting image of death on the countryside. The countryside itself and Americans' love for their countryside are both present in John Steuart Curry's "Wisconsin Landscape," a great sprawling image of a great sprawling land.

The sculpture is also first rate, and again it establishes that the American tradition is concerned more with the way things look and feel than with the way artists feel at the thought of their materials. The sculpture section is certainly less distinctively "American" than the painting section, but that reflects the nature of sculpture, which is more generalized than painting. Ideal images of all kinds abound. As we commented here lately, the image of man in sculpture is more often the image of woman and there are some splendid bronze nudes at Moscow. If recent reports about a Soviet anti-sex league in art are true, the Russians will probably be shocked by some of the work on view, but that too should be one of the aims of an American art show in the Soviet Union.

The non-representational work, as it seems to most of the time in sculpture, still maintains a strong link to meaning in terms of the human form and especially to meaning in terms of man the maker. Lipton's "Sorcerer" in braised nickel and other metals does both and so does Roszak's "Hound of Heaven." Pure grace, operating for its own sweet sake, is the theme in a Calder mobile and in a revolving steel construction by José De Rivera.

All in all, the USIA has regained the level and surpassed it that it had attained the last time it got kicked. The agency's initial reaction to the new Congressional blasts has been good. It hasn't withdrawn the show or pulled out individual artists. At the same time, any bureau chief feels that his first duty is to keep the bureau in business; if Walter can create a real threat to the agency itself, the odds are USIA will climb gingerly back down from the height now achieved. The loss will be the nation's.

The whole question of an artist's politics is, in practice, utterly irrelevant to his art. There are two questions to be put to any artist: Do you have anything to say? And do you know how to say it? In a very high proportion of our paintings and sculptures at Moscow, the answer is Yes.

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If de Gaulle Follows de Gaulle

A Settlement in Algeria Is Still Possible

by JEAN DANIEL

IMPORTANT EVENTS, in France, take place during the summer. On the eve of leaving for their vacation, all Frenchmen wonder whether they will be surprised this year at the sea, in the mountains or abroad by some decisive happening or some spectacular break in the routine of affairs.

From where could such a surprise come this summer? Obviously from Algeria. Or, in any event, about Algeria. Neither Geneva nor the Summit conference, neither NATO nor the Middle East presents a problem in which the French feel themselves really involved. For five years Algeria has dominated French politics, defeated governments and brought down Republics. Ever-present, demanding and destructive, the Algerian problem has taken first place among worries and imposed a new and special attitude toward the world.

A great French essayist, M. Raymond Aron, said to me the other day that no matter what the future of Algeria might be he foresaw that its role would remain the same for a generation. A whole library could be filled with all the books, all the newspapers, all the studies and all the reports published in France during the last three years exclusively devoted to Algeria. As many, in fact, as the critical studies of American civilization produced in the United States.

What can happen? First of all, it is quite possible that nothing will happen. And despite the paradox, that is already an important fact. For the French economy is not endangered by the cost of the war in Algeria, and will not be in the near future. All the calculations made abroad on this subject have proved false. It is true that in 1957 the United States saved France which, because of the war in Algeria, was on the brink of bankruptcy. But many things have changed since. France has won several years of grace: at least a temporary prosperity has made the outward signs of difficulty disappear. France's total expenditures in Algeria amount to about 70 billion francs a year. This is a large sum but a considerable portion of it represents what has been called a transfer rather than a supplement: France spends in Algeria scarcely more than it would have spent to maintain the NATO divisions.

Moreover, the French losses in Algeria are minimal. This fact is not well enough known. On the one hand, one Frenchman for every 10 Moslems dies in Algeria. On the other hand, it often happens that this Frenchman is himself a Moslem who has rallied to the French cause, or a volunteer soldier, as are the legionnaires and the parachutists. The losses, therefore, are not the kind to upset a small French village, a labor union or a factory. They can be forgotten as the losses by automobile accidents on a particularly catastrophic weekend can be forgotten. The real price of the Algerian war is paid by the Algerian people and the combatants. There is no reason, therefore, to expect a reaction in France of the kind produced in the United States by the Korean War.

Finally, there can be no awakening of public opinion as a result of military disaster, as in the case of Indo-China, because another Dien Bien Phu is inconceivable. There is no great fixed battle. There is no part of the territory occupied *permanently* by the men of the resistance. Tunisia and Morocco are not China, and it becomes more and more difficult to cross the borders. Transformation of the guerrilla warfare into general insurrection, in accordance with the tactics of Mao Tse-tung, is scarcely possible.

Thus, the situation might continue as it is without seeming to disrupt national life. That at least is the reasoning of those in the French Government who believe that time is working in favor of the present French policy. I have also observed that certain correspondents of large circulation American weeklies, like *Time* or *Newsweek*, have recently acquired the same point of view. They base their view on direct observation of local changes in the Algerian situation: the war is tiring the people; the achievements of the Constantine Plan have shown them the advantages of integration; a third force is being born among the Moslems, which arises from the exhaustion of the *Front de la Liberation Nationale Algerienne* (FLN).

In the light of all these arguments, French official circles say they no longer have any fears except a lack

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of solidarity among the allies and in particular a weakening in the friendship of the United States for France. They add that such a weakening would be the more dramatic for the fact that the French are fighting in Algeria for the Free World.

All this seems logical enough. But unfortunately it is partly false. Even if France can stand the Algerian war for several years more, the struggle works to the detriment of its democratic institutions. For several months it has been practically impossible to examine the Algerian situation objectively and coldly without being put in the camp of "anti-France" and of treason.

ALTHOUGH the recent parliamentary discussions in the Senate gave the appearance of democracy, in the Chamber of Deputies, on the contrary, the most moderate representatives of the opposition have not been able to make themselves heard, the most elementary parliamentary rules have not been respected and, for the first time, an unmistakable atmosphere of pre-Fascism was felt. Bills have been presented to forbid writers and journalists from advocating negotiations. Public meetings have been disturbed with the acquiescence of the public authorities and speakers have been beaten up by bands of young thugs. Each time—as in a recent case—that the FLN shows that it is not dead and carries out military activities, the blame is publicly put on the section of public opinion opposed to integration. Since the war has been proclaimed practically won, the FLN crushed and the Moslem masses rallied to the French side, as soon as a test shows the opposite of these claims, those who had denounced their errors are made the scapegoats.

In Algeria itself, the correspondents are not mistaken when they say that the people are tired and that despite the state of war, they are aware of the advantages of the Constantine Plan. The French effort has been gigantic and, moreover, thousands of examples can be cited of French officers whose conduct has been humane, understanding and altogether admirable. As a Frenchman, I am happy and proud that the foreign correspondents recognized these facts. But also as a Frenchman, I am greatly distressed to have to say that they have drawn fallacious conclusions from their observations.

First of all, the state of war hurts a large number of persons and it cannot be said that these victims, when they survive, are ready to welcome the benefits given to them. Then, and perhaps above all, the Moslem Algerian mentality must be fully understood if present attitudes are to be accurately evaluated. One of my friends who lives permanently among the Moslem Algerians told me recently that each time a new school, a new hospital or a new road was built, the people use and profit from them but their gratitude goes to the FLN without which, they say, France would not have been forced to make such an effort. Nothing can be done to combat the moral debt to the FLN. The people feel themselves represented by the FLN, even when they disapprove of the conduct and the methods of the *maquisards* and their leaders. This attitude goes so far that in certain regions, a Moslem told me recently, his friends are not fighting so much for the independence of Algeria as to be worthy of the FLN.

Of this, Premier Debre is unaware but General de Gaulle knows it and that is to his honor. Everything shows that he is aware of it. He has never uttered an offensive, degrading or even contemptuous word about the FLN leaders. He has never insulted the "Algerian revolution." He says that the struggle is sterile, the war useless, and he proposes to build rather than to destroy. And although he does not use the language which the Algerian revolutionaries would like, he does have some sense of respect for them and for the practicalities of the situation. The President of the French Republic has solemnly declared that "some day we will have to finish by discussing with the FLN." But the fact is that the Chief of State does not have the same policy as his prime minister whom he allows to speak and to act in a sense contrary to his own deepest convictions.

General de Gaulle has spoken enough words and given enough evidence of his intention that peace return in Algeria through "the association of Algeria and France, thanks to a free consultation of the Algerians and the French." The truth, however, is that there are two policies in France and, in friendship, I say to the foreign correspondents, as to the diplomats, that they should distinguish between these two policies before asserting that time works for the one or the other, or before declaring that the United States supports one or the other. For M. Michel Debre it is quite easy: as he can not have the army of his policy, he has the policy of his army. That is to say, he is integrationist, opposed to the Franco-Maghrebian confederation, hostile to Bourguiba and furious at the very idea of negotiations.

For the President of the French Republic it is another story. He had confidence in himself, too much confidence. Last autumn he was convinced that the leaders of the FLN would agree to come to Paris, and that he would then be able to persuade them to accept his theses and to make peace. After the refusal of the FLN, General de Gaulle is distrustful. And, above all, on the other hand, his prestige and authority have relatively diminished in France and disappeared among the French and the Army in Algeria. The charm no longer works. His power, which he uses sparingly, is less absolute. His parliament is reactionary, and a majority of his ministers are linked by commitments made on May 13, 1958, to the military and political leaders of Algiers. He has disappointed even the most faithful of those who are called the Left Gaullists, the heroes of the Resistance who were his most loyal companions at a time when he was alone and disavowed.

General de Gaulle feels all this; he notices it and probably he is beginning to worry about it despite his

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desire to remain the arbiter and not to deviate from that role except to indicate in noble discourses the broad lines of French policy. And because it is thought that he feels all this, the question arises in France, where it is known that he is not a man to allow himself to be left behind, whether he will react this summer. Perhaps on the occasion of the visit of the King of Morocco? Perhaps on some other occasion?

In that case, there will be a test of strength. A test which the Chief of State has always refused since June 18, 1940, because he has not wanted to divide France and above all the Army. Refused because he is a tactician and awaits his hour; because he is not yet sure of being able to do all he plans with the FLN; because, finally, it is not in keeping with the concept of his destiny he has formed at the end of his life to fail to restore French unity.

Nevertheless, this summer one suddenly has the impression that pride, the sense of accomplishment, and the necessities of national interest will prevail over the feeling he has about himself and the vision he has of his own place in history.

The two things could be joined together. In effect General de Gaulle has the choice of being reduced to impotence, of being devoured, of becoming a porcelain vase or of again daring the risk of division. It is a pathetic choice on which the fate of France and the future orientation of Algeria depend.

What would the test of strength be? Unfortunately, it concerns only the powerful French army of Algeria and the European extremists of Algiers. Today these men have networks throughout the territory of metropolitan France and particularly in the police, in the administration, and in the General Staffs of France itself. Facing these networks, the liberal Gaullists, the labor unions, the working masses, the republican parties are badly organized and lack fighting spirit. Organization and combativity would probably emerge when the test came, especially if General de Gaulle decided to encourage them. And by the same token the audacity of the opposition to the General would considerably diminish. But people are not convinced that this would happen, and it is precisely the powerful double prospect of the Fascist threat and the weakness of the eventual liberal reaction which has weighed heavily for a year on French policy and the policy of the state.

In the face of these growing difficulties, what should be the attitude of the United States? In principle, a Frenchman should be able to expect nothing from abroad, even from allies, and should resent any mixing in French affairs by others. But today the French Government nullifies such scruples by claiming aid in the name of the Atlantic community in such a manner that Algeria is implicitly presented not as a strictly French matter but as a problem linked to NATO.

I do not know if the Algerian war is of service to the free world. Or whether, on the contrary, the war projects Tunisia, Morocco and the Arab world into a completely Soviet orientation and paves the way for the propaganda of the East. No doubt the American diplomats in Tunis, Rabat, Cairo and Baghdad know much better than I. What I do know is that for the first time the United States has the privileged possibility of helping us without offending us, of favoring our policy without injuring our national sensitivity. It is quite easy: all that is needed is to take the speeches of General de Gaulle, to draw from them the political philosophy which inspires them, and to declare to France and to the world: "This is the philosophy of the Head of the French State; this is therefore the policy and the only policy which we will support with all our strength." General de Gaulle has praised the courage of the combatants of the FLN, he has invited the leaders of the FLN to Paris, he has spoken of Algeria's having "a choice place in the community" of the free *association* with France, and he has affirmed that the destiny of the Algerians could only be the fruit of the will of the Algerians themselves. After that, all that is necessary to restore the peace is the procedure. Then the United States could ask us Frenchmen: "Which policy do you want us to support, that of the President of the French Republic or that of the Army?"

THE TWO BASIC QUESTIONS, *I think, are: Will [de Gaulle] be driven, by the semi-Fascists or the Colonels, further along toward authoritarianism than he wants to go? And will he achieve a synthesis between the imperial ambitions of the French and the necessities of our century? In Black Africa this synthesis, in the form of the choice between secession and* Communaute, *is imperfect; but a more satisfactory evolution is not impossible. Vastly more difficult will be the achievement of such a synthesis in Algeria, where there are two extremes, and it seems almost impossible to find a middle way between the opposing slogans of integration and independence, or to reconcile warring spokesmen.*

"DE GAULLE, DERNIERE ILLUSION?" *Herbert Luthy asked recently. The die is not yet cast. For a few months General de Gaulle can do anything he likes; he can even make peace in Algeria. He can also demonstrate to his countrymen that they have only to accept France as she is, in the world as it is, for the road to the future to open straight before them.*

RAYMOND ARON

A letter from Paris in "Encounter" December, 1958

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THE STATE OF THE UNIONS—V

Beyond Bread and Butter

by WARNER BLOOMBERG, JR., JOEL SEIDMAN and VICTOR HOFFMANN

ORGANIZED labor's "voice" sounds louder to practical politicians, as we suggested earlier, than it does to others. To politicians it speaks first of all in terms of money. COPE had about a million dollars in voluntary funds to distribute in 1958, and there were 322 candidates for the House and Senate who might have merited support. (These voluntary funds are not used for Governors, whose contests are not covered by the Taft-Hartley law and can therefore receive contributions made directly from union treasuries.) Three or four thousand dollars is a very sizable contribution for many Congressional candidates, and in some states contributions to Senatorial candidates reached $5,000. Though not so large compared with political funds raised by industrial and corporate groups, their effectiveness was stretched by the careful distribution of the money so that candidates in "undecided" contests received proportionately more than those in either certain or hopeless districts.

In the industrialized urban areas where labor organization for politicking has been most fully developed, unions also can talk in terms of votes—votes swayed by union endorsements, votes carried to the polls in union-sponsored cars, votes located and mobilized by unionists out ringing doorbells. Endorsement alone is of questionable effectiveness, but combined with other union political tactics, it may help alter or deliver enough votes among members without strong attachments to particular parties or candidates to produce that 5 or 10 percent change which can be critical.

When preparing their endorsements in 1958, Cleveland unionists were surprised, according to Machinist district president Matt DeMore, to find Republicans as well as Democrats, not only returning COPE questionnaires, but showing up for interviews as well. "We found and endorsed some liberal Republicans we probably wouldn't have known about otherwise." DeMore feels strongly that labor should neither be "married to nor captured by" the Democrats.

A shrewd member of the staff in the AFL-CIO headquarters, whose job involves politicking, argues that unions' political action can "accelerate or decelerate a trend, but cannot change the course of an election. On the other hand, altering the pattern by 10 percent, or even less, may make the difference in who gets elected." Like many others in labor political work, he sees far more union members responding to specific labor issues when they vote than to general liberal programs for broad social reforms.

A member of the AFL-CIO's public relations staff makes a similar argument. He feels that the single-minded concentration of Ohio unions on the "right-to-work" issue brought them victory in both the referendum on the law and in many Congressional elections. "The trade union member reacts in basic defense of his organization, when the chips are down." The failure of organized labor in New York to develop real "labor" issues contributed, he believes, to the Rockefeller-spearheaded election triumph of the Republicans. And as for Reuther's "broad" approach to politics, well, "that works fine in Michigan where you have a good party organization, the Auto Workers with all their strength, and the ready-made issue of Detroit recession for workers who aren't impressed by Reuther idealism!"

Those who are reluctant to see labor allied to a single party or hitched to too broad a program for reform also insist that the larger the role unions assume in party politics, the more they themselves must be prepared to act as brokers among the competing interests. Organized labor's strength in these shifting coalitions has been, essentially, that of a "one idea" group. That also has been its source of labor's solidarity.

How can labor be effective both in a party role and as a pressure group, we were asked? Can it perform as a bargaining agent in the economic realm and increasingly serve as a broker of interests in the political realm? What will happen if, as has often been characteristic in American political life, the party in which organized labor has become involved undergoes a long period of defeat? Meanwhile, where is labor to get the time, money, leadership and expertise to carry on simultaneously both the strictly union and the enlarged political functions? Some who hold this view couple it with a reminder that continued failure to organize other segments of the work force than those now in unions will in time reduce labor's proportionate numbers and thus its political

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strength, adding that fear of unions as a radical political force, or of them becoming "too big" or "too powerful" may make the organizing task more difficult than it is now.

Nevertheless, unionists who want to be able to affect the selection as well as the election of candidates point to the prospect of increasing government intervention in union internal affairs, the experience of a hostile administration's effects on collective bargaining through the policies of important government agencies, and the need for legislative support at state and national levels for such union goals as pensions and unemployment insurance. They argue that the failure of organized labor to involve itself further in party politics will leave it too often choosing only between the lesser of evils, which may not be "good" enough.

For its own security, these unionists argue, and certainly for success with any program of broad social reform, organized labor needs a political vehicle it can count on. This does not mean "capturing" the Democrats or being "captured" by them; it means adding enough strength to liberal groups already within the Democratic Party to make them predominant.

It is indeed hard to see how the AFL-CIO can avoid increasing identification, if not "integration," with the Democrats, given simply the formula of "help your friends."

One consequence of the increase in political activity has been the growing personal contacts between union actives and the core of local party workers. More and more union members are themselves becoming precinct or ward committeemen. This also ties the unions more closely to the Democratic Party, in which most unionists become active. More union members have begun to run for public office, with union-based political activity to help them (though unions seldom endorse a man just because he holds a union card and sometimes refuse to do so because of preference for a regular "party" candidate). A few years ago only a few hundred union members held public offices of any kind; now there are more than a thousand.

Lower-case "politics"

BUT ALL this is politics with a capital P, and there is a lower-case "politics"—civic and community affairs—in which labor's increasing participation has had little notice. Those who have been born into the amenities of middle-class status seldom realize what it has meant to many workers to have the more visible lines of class difference blurred in industrial cities and towns. It is not only that the better paid millhands may now drive to work in cars as expensive as the bosses, returning to homes as "nice" (in the picture-window, brick-facing, evergreen-trimmed sense) as the foremen's and the office workers'. They also are increasingly being "counted in" with respect to the civic affairs and community decision-making that heretofore had been the honorific monopoly of the upper strata.

Of special importance to the less well-to-do workers is the passing of the "lady bountiful" character of many private social work agencies. In hundreds of cities and towns union members now sit on the committees of Community Chests and the boards of member agencies, where formerly only business and professional people cast the votes that made policy. A decade ago the unionists who sat on local "health and welfare" boards could be counted in the hundreds. Today there are more than 45,000. The increase reflects more than just interest on the part of organized labor or good will among other segments of these communities. Those who control the finances upon which voluntarily supported agencies depend can and often do have a great deal to say about how funds are spent. Union contributions have increased phenomenally since World War II, with many locals throughout the country, especially among the industrial unions, utilizing the check-off as a way for "painless giving" by members. In Cleveland, not untypically, "employee giving" rose in a decade from less than a quarter of a million dollars to nearly a million dollars. In some communities the increase has amounted to 1,000 percent.

Getting individuals from organized labor on boards here and there, even key ones, is not an automatic improvement in community life or local democracy, except in the sense of breaking a long-standing and rather snobbish precedent. Much depends upon the performance of the union leaders. Too often they have been content to enjoy their new status and to feel that "getting representation" for unions was enough, even if it wasn't used for

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THIS IS the fifth of a series of articles examining the American labor movement since the merger.

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the sake of any particular improvement in programs. Where top local officials who take such positions are not the best trained, their performance, when they do more than "warm a chair," may not always redound to the credit of unionism. (In a middle-sized industrial city the top local labor leader and the top local corporation executive collaborated in maintaining Community Chest policies that contradicted recommendations of most of the best professional welfare agency people in the community.) A staff man in one large industrial city described the situation there as one in which "labor still gets pushed around a good deal on many of these committees. What it amounts to as yet is a few of the leaders sitting in on all the boards." But he was optimistic about the future benefits from union training programs.

Power of the Purse

WHATEVER their faults, their lack of training, their obvious lack of "polish," trade unionists by and large have taken into the social welfare area a special concern for the dignity as well as the sustenance of the person who needs help. In a small mill town a local officer described how unions there had obtained a seat on the hospital board and brought about certain changes in policy and procedures:

> This was a result of the hospital's dependence for support on a fund that now gets more than 70 percent of its income from us. At one time we not only threatened to withdraw, but we did withdraw for a little while, in order to change hospital policy. It used to be that destitute cases were dunned, hounded and sued. It was rotten—I don't mean the cheaters, I mean people who were out of work and the like. Now these cases are handled through the social service agencies. Now we get a sick list from the hospital each week that we can check against the membership so we know about our own people. It used to be that we could hardly ever get that service.

This local leader repeated a type of statement heard in most communities and on all levels of the union hierarchy: "All we ask on any of these boards is a fair distribution of what we contribute and fair consideration for our people." A staff man who is familiar with communities throughout the country where his international has locals put it even more generally with his assertion that "these people from the unions don't necessarily have to represent a labor point of view in any narrow sense in community affairs—and neither does organized labor. We think our point of view is one shared by liberal and progressive people generally, not something special and specific to organized labor." In many communities he found that "the professional social work people are quite close to labor and tend to attach themselves to the labor representatives who have come onto the boards."

All of this may not seem of very striking importance to Americans who have never needed hospitalization that couldn't be had because of finances, who have never sought help in order to feed a family, who have never had to face severe psychological crises without the wherewithal for 59-minute sessions on the couch or at least for counseling at a clinic, who have never tried to keep a big family going in a tiny flat in some tenement. But union leaders meet such "cases" every time they walk through a sizable factory. Some of them have become hardened to these "realities," but others only seem so because they would be embarrassed to repeat the sort of thing that Auto Worker William Lightner, Cleveland community services director for the AFL-CIO, can say without sounding in any way saccharine: "Christ came to serve, not to be served. The same should be true for us —our concern must be for all humanity."

The Cleveland program is an example of organized labor at its best in the community welfare services field. More than a thousand union members have participated in union counseling classes where they learn what services are available, how to refer workers in need of help to the right agency, how to interpret the needs of the agencies to fellow employees and the needs of employees to representatives of the agencies. Initial classes meet one night a week for 10 weeks, cover basic laws and agencies, and include several field trips. Advance classes meet one night a week for 15 weeks with special attention to more technical matters such as property ownership, wills, personal injury, divorce, garnishments, evictions, court procedure and the like. Graduates become members of the Union Counselor Association, which helps to "keep them in touch" and which holds an annual banquet complete with awards and after-dinner speaker.

(While Lightner was being interviewed a call came from one such counselor on behalf of an eviction case. The man was "afraid to go home and have his family thrown out." With more than 75,000 unemployed in the area at that time, the counselors were "a godsend" to the staffs of the regular agencies, whom Lightner described as being "swamped and underpaid.")

Given additional impetus by the merger, these community services' efforts are changing the status of the worker by destroying the condescension that accompanied so much of American "charity." Union leaders argue to their members that the support provided community agencies by organized labor gives every workingman a right to their services without feeling that he is a burden or a beggar. "After all," they repeat, "it's *our* money!" The "welfare community" little by little becomes a partly private, partly public, American version of the "welfare state." And this very development, like the medical and pension provisions achieved through collective bargaining, may reduce the pressure to provide for such basic human needs through state and national legislation.

It should not be thought, however, that union leaders are always welcome to boards and committees. In one

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city, which a Steelworker official described as a place "more likely to vote for a union man for president than for member of the board of education," a representative of organized labor asked the director of a major hospital why no unionist was on its board. "We select our board members on the basis of personal achievement," was the cool reply. "Just what has M..... done," asked the union man, referring to a member of one of the wealthiest of the local elite families, who was a member on all of the "best" boards, "besides get born to his mother and father?"

Union participation in such civic and social welfare work often was originally motivated by the desire to improve local public relations, to look more "respectable," rather than to stimulate any mild American version of "class conflict" or to alter the community's power structure. Often unionists sitting on boards of education or on library or hospital boards have been criticized for doing little besides serving as living symbols of organized labor's claims for a kind of broad political "parity" in local affairs.

Yet in other instances organized labor's *own* community projects bring it, quite unintentionally, into conflict with "powers that be." For example, intense opposition has come from the medical profession to union-sponsored health centers or arrangements for clinical services that violate the "sacred cow" of individual fees for services rendered. In Pennsylvania physicians serving community patients, mainly United Mine Workers' beneficiaries, were branded "unethical" by the state medical society and were denied hospital privileges. The ILGWU center in Cleveland and the UAW center in Toledo were limited to diagnostic service only because of opposition of organized medicine to a wider program. Nevertheless, union efforts in this direction continue, as the growing membership of the Association of Labor Health Administrators testifies. And the pressure of organized labor on both the medical profession and private group medical insurance plans (a number of major unions are considering leaving Blue Cross-Blue Shield because of growing costs and inadequate benefits) has contributed much to the AMA's first serious reconsideration of its traditional policies—an "agonizing reappraisal" which brought an historic change in policy at their June convention this year.

"Educating" the Unionists

JUST AS THE improvement in incomes among mill hands is eating away little by little at both the idea and the fact of "the working-class part of town," so the spreading of union activity out through the community is knocking down some of the old barriers of social status that once confined workers to a subordinate place in community decision-making. Local union political activity has been an essential part of this redistribution of power, but it is only partly responsible. As a union officer put it, "We're becoming people who *do* instead of always being *done to* or *done for!*"

In a New Jersey city, unionists pushed successfully for improvements in traffic ordinances. In a New York city, they made recommendations to the municipal council to cope with the problem of local water pollution. In Akron, Ohio, a Rubber Workers local started a Teen Club since the city ran no organized youth recreation program. Union representatives sit on citizens' planning commissions throughout the country, in Des Moines, Iowa, as well as in the labor stronghold of Pittsburgh. Steelworkers in several cities have helped promote symphony orchestras. In Kenosha, Wisconsin, a UAW local sponsored art exhibitions. The Steelworkers allow their union halls to be used by all sorts of civic and community groups. While unionists have appeared less often and performed less well on library and school boards, AFL-CIO regional director Charles Heymanns maintains that in Wisconsin "a lot of our people are doing a cracking good job" in such positions—an achievement which he credits in part to the highly developed extension program of the University of Wisconsin.

But not all unionists are convinced that this spreading out of union concerns into wider and wider areas of community life is entirely a good thing. In Akron, Ohio, a district official of a former AFL union complained:

> I went to a central labor union meeting a while back and there were reports from the Boy Scouts, the Girl Scouts, the TB fund, the United Fund, the polio drive —I kept waiting for a trade union report.

What worries him is that this participation of organized labor in community affairs may be doing more to transform the unionists than to change the community. In several cities we have observed first-hand how business leaders, once over the "shock" of labor's incursions into their formerly secure bailiwicks of civic uplift and bureaucratized charity, go about "educating" the unionists. The latter slowly learn to dress and speak in a more "respectable" way, and sometimes it seems that in acquiring an exterior sound and appearance more like that of business and professional people they also come to perceive the community in ways more like that of their fellow board members than their fellow unionists in the rank and file.

But there is no turning back, here, either. Whatever its long-run implications, union involvement in community affairs and in social welfare work through local institutions will increase.

> (BLOOMBERG: Each union-based community activity by itself is "small potatoes." Taken altogether they reflect and add to changes in American society. Sometimes reforms can be pushed through all in a piece, especially during times when a whole society is in some turmoil, as was

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this country in the thirties. Organized labor is still promoting major liberal legislation in such areas as civil rights, education, social security, housing and the like. But it seems to me that it also is possible to alter the fabric of society bit by bit, changing the pattern of American life a stitch at a time. The piecemeal, seemingly haphazard involvement of unionists in party politics may be an effective alternative to either the all but defunct dream of a separate political entity for "the working class" or the new dream that some labor leaders have of making the Democratic Party a "programmatic party" in the European sense. As workers become more like middle-class people and middle-class people like workers (witness blue-jean casualness and hot-rodding), older strictly class-oriented conceptions of politics become increasingly over-simplified guides for organized labor's political strategists.)

(HOFFMANN: This is an area where I find enlightening generalities even harder to come by than usual. Some union leaders undoubtedly are capable of playing politics American party style—some as statesmen, some as manipulators and interest brokers. But most of organized labor is still far too narrow and provincial a pressure group to carry on that sort of function. Nor am I certain we would really want it otherwise. We have called labor-business economic coalitions "collusion." In at least one community we know of thorough labor-business collaboration on the Community Chest was detrimental to the development of social welfare service. Is it so inconceivable that we might not get some unfortunate labor-business political coalitions in the future?)

(SEIDMAN: Realistically, we should not underestimate the tenacity of the "AFL tradition" with its emphasis on politics as only a supplement to collective bargaining. While more and more union goals appear to be affected by political decisions, a great many unionists see this increased "spillover" into the political arena as requiring more effort in politics but not a different kind. This outlook, typical of most major interest groups in our country, is itself in part the historical product of our political structure with its often ambiguous parties lacking in centralized direction. Another fundamental fact of life is our class structure with its broad and not very rigidly structured middle range, with unions encompassing such diverse people as hod carriers, assembly-line workers, $12,000-a-year steel mill rollers, highly skilled plumbers and electricians who are potential little businessmen, and performing artists. How much of political relevance can a large majority of such diverse people agree upon outside of "union issues"?)

(HOFFMANN: Perhaps they all agree that they want whoever is running the store to have more respect for both the employees and the customers. It's when the Chamber of Commerce in this or that American town or city gets around to taxes rather than traffic, to public housing rather than paint-up week, that the little cadre of labor leaders who may have been invited or enticed into membership become restive and sometimes, in the eyes of other members, "abusive"!)

What Makes the "Farm Problem"?

by MURRAY R. BENEDICT

IT IS HARD for our highly urbanized society to understand the underlying causes of the "farm problem" or why, after nearly four decades of argument and expenditure of many billions of dollars, it has not been solved. In the first place, this is not primarily a party issue; party differences here tend to be matters of degree or direction rather than of basic concept. Even in the 1920's, the Congressional approaches to the farm problem were surprisingly nonpartisan. In the very first years of that decade, the farm bloc was causing political headaches for a Republican Administration backed on most issues by a predominantly Republican Congress. Much later, in the 80th Congress, the bills put forward by the House and Senate committees, both headed by Republicans, differed more than did the positions traditionally taken by spokesmen for the two major parties.

The depression of the 1930's brought fairly general agreement that something drastic had to be done to help the farmer. Generally speaking, farm-state Congressmen and farm leaders of both parties worked together to devise workable programs. And what they did, in the main, was to give the Administration almost a free hand to try any or all of the plans that had been seriously proposed. In its basic elements the current program is still essentially the one that took shape in that period. However, the setting has changed and the program has been subjected to severe distortions that grew out of wartime needs and legislation.

In the 1930's, the major cause of farm distress was a

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drastic decline in demand. Farm production was not badly out of line with the needs of the people of this and other countries. But with millions of workers unemployed and other millions on low or uncertain incomes, a normal flow of farm products could not be sold at prices that seemed fair either to farmers or to those responsible for making legislative and administrative policy. The impact of depression was not the same in the farm and nonfarm sectors of the economy. Nonfarm workers and businesses had to take their punishment in the form of unemployment and sharply reduced average incomes. Industrial production was cut back quickly and drastically. Agriculture, an atomistic and highly competitive industry, tended to maintain output and to take its losses in the form of sharply reduced prices.

It would have seemed logical to encourage agriculture to continue to produce the food and fibre needed and to restore quickly the purchasing power of consumers so that these needed supplies could move at prices the farmers could live on. But restoring demand after a severe depression, like the recovery of strength after a severe illness, is a slow process.

Meanwhile, farm prices were virtually at all-time lows and the overriding demand, both in business and agriculture, was for action on the price front. In agriculture, this took the form of efforts to cut back production in a variety of ways ranging from the plowing up of cotton and the slaughter of little pigs to the imposition of acreage controls and the subsidized destruction of fruits. But controlling production in highly competitive agriculture is by no means easy. This was not a situation in which boards of directors could decide how much to produce and could allocate resources accordingly. Neither was it one in which strongly organized unions could induce, or coerce, workers to refrain from working at less than standard rates. Instead, it was one in which there were at that time more than five million independent entrepreneurs, each making his own decisions as to how much to produce and most of them with strong incentives to produce as much as possible.

PRODUCTION controls were thus only moderately successful, perhaps fortunately, so far as the economy as a whole was concerned. For if agricultural production could actually have been reduced enough to restore farm prices to the levels considered appropriate, it would have meant throttling down all of the economy to the low tempo then prevailing in the nonfarm parts of the economy. Consumers would have had less to eat and the cost of living would have been significantly higher. Farm prices did improve some though they were still low as late as 1940. Meanwhile, there was an abundance of food for those who had even a modest amount of buying power.

Up to that time there was no clear indication of the great technological revolution that was to come later. Yields of most of the major crops hadn't changed much in the 75 years for which records were available. Hence the effort to cut down production by reducing acres planted seemed logical. But the great agricultural machine had within it as yet unsuspected potentials for rapid expansion of production. The incentives for full use of these potentials were lacking, and parts of agriculture were being deliberately held down to keep output from expanding.

That situation was suddenly changed by the outbreak of World War II. Demand strengthened; prices began to improve; and underemployed labor was rapidly drawn out of agriculture. The coming need for more and more food, which a fully employed labor force would be abundantly able to buy, soon became apparent. Government policy shifted from an attempt to keep the lid on production to a positive effort to lift it. Outlets were assured; price incentives were provided; and production goals replaced quotas. Farmers had almost every incentive to put the industry into high gear and to produce as much as they could. Furthermore, there was a substantial reservoir of new machines, new techniques and new knowledge that had not been drawn on in the two preceding decades of low prices and capital starvation.

The results exceeded the most optimistic expectations.

Proposed Legislative Remedies

CONGRESS and the President have reached an impasse on farm legislation. On June 25 Mr. Eisenhower vetoed two bills approved by Congress governing wheat and tobacco production, and there seems little chance that a compromise will be reached in this session. The President said in his veto that the proposed new wheat program providing tighter production controls and higher price supports was neither realistic nor constructive. By returning to "the discredited high rigid price supports," he said, it "would hasten the complete collapse of the entire wheat program." And Congress' proposal to stabilize price supports for tobacco, the President said in vetoing that bill, "would not prevent further losses" in foreign markets.

Senate and House Agriculture Committees are now examining alternative bills. But the outlook for agreement is bleak.

In reopened hearings held in the House since June 25, Ezra Taft Benson has simply reiterated the President's recommendations of last January. "You won't budge one inch," Rep. Poage (D, Tex.) chided the Secretary. And Benson admitted under questioning that he would again advise veto of "any legislation that would raise price supports by one penny." The Committee Chairman in turn pointed out that "not a man from a wheat district on this Committee agrees with that philosophy."

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In spite of a growing scarcity of labor, agricultural production increased by more than 20 percent between 1939 and 1944, though it was already high in terms of past performance. Even under war conditions, and with heavy demands from abroad, US per-capita food consumption increased by more than 6 percent in the same period. Vast quantities of food were supplied to the armed forces and to our allies. Thanks in part to the effective response of agriculture and in part to favorable weather, consumers were spared the tight rationing and austere diets that most European countries had to contend with during the war years. The surplus problem was temporarily a thing of the past, and it was not to reappear until the end of the decade.

But in the effort to encourage all-out production and partly in response to the strong political power of agriculture, high levels of price support for farm products were written into the laws during the war years, including promises that these levels of price support would be continued for at least two years after the war. Later they were extended throughout the 1940's and into the 1950's. Agricultural production continued to increase and, at least until the end of the decade, this increase was needed.

As well as supplying the strong domestic demand, it enabled the United States to come to the rescue of a battered Western Europe on a scale never previously approached even in wartime. Much of Europe was stripped of livestock and short of machinery, fertilizers and manpower. Its processing and transportation facilities had been destroyed or damaged and, to add to the difficulties, it encountered a 1946-47 winter of almost unprecedented severity and an extremely severe and widespread drought in the summer of 1947.

OUR response was effective and generous. It was made possible by two things, continuing high production in US agriculture and the special financing provided by the Marshall Plan. Even during what some Europeans refer to as "The Hungry Period" minimum requirements for survival were provided. In 1948 alone we exported more than half a billion bushels of wheat, almost all of it to Western Europe. At the same time our own people were eating more and better food than ever before.

This abnormal need had slackened by 1950. Troublesome surpluses were in fact beginning to appear in some lines as early as 1949. The demand for farm products was revived temporarily, and largely speculatively, by the outbreak of war in Korea but soon slacked off and the era of ever-mounting stocks of storable agricultural commodities was upon us.

As a result of 10 years or more of strong incentives for all-out agricultural production, forces had been set in motion that were to plague us from 1953 on. Agriculture was geared for high production. Immense amounts of capital, in the form of machinery, organization, soil fertility and know-how had become available. As yet, there was little incentive for farmers to slow down production. Farm prices, on what was virtually a free market basis, had been well above "parity" in the late 1940's and early 1950's. Parity itself is a generous yardstick, one that for two decades was looked upon as something to be hoped for but probably not to be achieved. In the speculative boom of 1951, farm prices rose to all-time highs, thus giving further impetus to the technological revolution that had already gained a good deal of momentum. The new Administration coming in in 1953 and faced by rapidly mounting surpluses urged some easing down of the wartime price incentives then in effect, but there was not only strong political opposition to such a course but very real doubt that lower prices would actually bring about the desired easing off of production. Once production capacity has been built up in agriculture it takes a very drastic decline in prices to cause it not to be used.

Labor was being withdrawn from farms and acreages were being held down, but the technological revolution could not be stopped. For American agriculture it was perhaps as fundamental and difficult to deal with as the industrial revolution that had unsettled Western Europe so profoundly in the period around 1800. No longer are American farmers accepting new ideas reluctantly and slowly. They are welcoming them eagerly and reaching out for more, that is, for new forms of organization, improved strains of crops and animals and new production techniques. Once such a process is underway, improvements that may at first be undertaken as a means of improving profits must be adopted as a way of reducing losses. Consequently, they tend to spread throughout the industry very quickly. The farmer who does not "go modern" soon drops hopelessly out of the running. Greater productivity would seem not to be something to be deplored, but so far as food is concerned, once a nation is as well fed as ours now is demand can grow only about as fast as population grows. If production increases faster, prices fall to unacceptably low levels or unused stocks pile up. Since our policy has been to support prices, the imbalance shows up in the form of burdensome and costly stocks held by the government. This relates mainly to a fairly small number of products but they are important ones; for example, wheat, the feed grains, cotton, tobacco and, potentially, hogs. The products directly supported probably do not account for more than 35 to 40 percent of the total output of agriculture, but if these are cut back the problem spills over into other lines that are now managing fairly well without government price support. The prices of beef cattle, fruits and vegetables, poultry products and, as of now, hogs are not supported by the government.

But if we have more production capacity than we need, it is reasonable to ask why we don't simply withdraw

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enough of it to bring the situation into balance. That process *has* been going on for quite some time, but the upsurge in productivity has been at an even faster pace. (Farm output in 1956 was more than 40 percent above that of 1939.) The average number of persons employed in agriculture *has* declined markedly, from 12.7 million in 1935 to 7.9 million in 1956, and it is still going down. In 1910 the number so employed was 13.6 million though the total population of the United States was then only 91.9 million, scarcely more than half what it is now. In most countries, well over half the population is engaged in agriculture. Here, about 12 to 13 percent of the employed labor force produces agricultural products so abundantly that we are concerned as to how to make effective use of them.

BUT, even so, this does not explain why we should not reduce the number of farm workers still further if we still have too many. Part of the difficulty arises from the distribution of skills and resources within agriculture. The most efficient half of the agricultural labor force produces about 90 percent of the agricultural products that go to market. This leaves another 1.5 to 2 million farmers who not only do not fare well but cannot easily shift from agriculture to something else. Many are past middle age and have no other skills. Family and community ties hold them where they are. Pulling up stakes and relocating takes money and some little courage, especially if one has a family. Many of the younger farm people are, however, shifting to other occupations as is abundantly evident from the figures given above. But to make fully and quickly the adjustment that appears to be needed would involve more hardship and more drastic measures than society appears to be willing to countenance. Hence the process of human readjustment seems almost certain to be a slow and difficult one. A similar problem on a smaller scale has long been evident in the soft coal industry.

Much more significant is the fact that migration away from agriculture of small-scale, low-production farmers will not solve the problem. They will not take their farms with them, and the most likely outcome is that such lands will be merged into the larger, more efficient farms and will then produce more than they do now! However, the spread of industry and other lines of business to the rural areas has enabled hundreds of thousands of these small-scale farmers to supplement the returns from their farms with other income, and their average financial situation has, in fact, improved materially in recent years despite the fact that their income from agriculture has remained almost constant since 1945.

Though the over-all results do not reflect it, the adjustments made in US agriculture have actually been far more impressive than most people realize. Last year's record-breaking wheat crop was grown on an acreage that was nearly a fifth smaller than the 1947-1956 average. It was 30 percent under the peak acreage of 1949. The cotton acreage harvested in 1958 was less than 12 million. In the 1925-1930 period we were growing almost four times as many acres of cotton. The story is similar for many of the other crops. In 1958 we grew 3.8 billion bushels of corn on 73.5 million acres whereas in the early 1930's we were growing around 2.5 billion bushels on more than 100 million acres. The appallingly wasteful potato crops of the period around 1950 were actually grown on an acreage that was less than half what was considered normal and necessary in the early and middle 1930's.

I cite these figures not as either a defense or condemnation of current or past programs but merely to explain why adjustment has proved so difficult. The factors that go into agricultural production are land, labor, capital, organization and technology. Of these, only the land factor can be brought under effective control, and even that is far from easy. Land taken out of one crop tends to be shifted to some other crop. Under American conditions, improved technology, once it is developed, tends to be adopted quickly and widely. Also it tends to feed on itself and to continue to grow. Capital investments are extremely difficult if not impossible to control. Labor will shift only as it has inducements and opportunities that make such shifting attractive. This leaves the burden mainly on the land factor. Hence the acreage control schemes and soil conservation programs of the 1930's and the soil bank plan of the present period. But land can't be taken out fast enough to offset wheat yields that have moved up from around 14 bushels in the pre-World War II period to 27.3 bushels in 1958, or a cotton output that averaged less than 200 pounds per acre prior to the middle 1930's and is now well over 400 pounds. Similar but less easily measured improvements have been occurring in the livestock industries.

Clearly we do not want to go on producing and storing things for which we have no use. But as in most other major economic adjustments, peoples' lives, homes, investments and skills are involved. If we are to avoid very great hardships to very large numbers of people, changes are bound to be somewhat slow and halting. The stocks we have built up do not consist of the kinds of things most needed either in our own economy or in the world at large, but we need to find ways to make more effective use of them and, as soon as possible, to stop building them up unless we do have use for them either here or abroad. There are political obstacles to be overcome as well as economic ones, and the problem may become more troublesome before it gets better. But we are at least coming to have a better understanding of the nature of it, which is an essential step toward solution. In the meantime, we can console ourselves to some extent by keeping in mind that an economy of overabundance is far easier to live with than one of extreme scarcity.

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BOOKS & COMMENT

Earl Mazo's Nixon

by Edward T. Folliard

WHEN word got around last year that Earl Mazo was doing a book about Vice President Richard M. Nixon, Mazo's newspaper colleagues wondered why. Mazo gives the answer on the first page of this new book, saying: "For all his prominence and the millions of words that have been written and spoken about him, surprisingly little is known about Richard Milhous Nixon."

Richard Nixon:
A Personal and Political Portrait
by Earl Mazo
(Harper; $3.95)

This is certainly no compliment to Nixon's earlier biographers; indeed it smacks of arrogance and conceit. Yet that was the way Mazo saw it and he set out to correct the situation. The book he has written is a reporter's work, not a pundit's analysis; it is the work of a fact-hungry newspaperman who likes to use his legs, talk to everybody concerned, and clean up on a story.

Mazo must have promised himself that he would try to be objective, and he may even have had in mind Cromwell's words to the artist, "Paint me, warts and all."

Some warts do show up on Nixon in this portrait, but there is no reason to believe that Nixon will be offended. He and Mazo are good friends, despite Mazo's background as a South Carolina Democrat. They have travelled a lot together, in political campaigns in this country and on trips to Africa, Europe and Latin America—Mazo in his role as a political reporter.

The Nixon who emerges here is a fiercely ambitious man; fundamentally shy and a brooder; a Quaker who has been heard to explode with a "son of a bitch"; a "master politician" who wants to be President but who knows that he could become a "political casualty"—an "also-ran."

Mazo does not make the mistake so many have made by writing about an old Nixon and a new Nixon. He merely says that in Nixon's case "there has been a tempering of his outlook in general," and he gives an example.

When Adlai Stevenson said in a 1954 campaign speech that the American economy was shrinking while the Soviet economy was growing, Nixon accused him of "spreading pro-Communist propaganda." Four years later, however, Nixon told the Newspaper Publishers Association that Americans should ponder the "sobering fact [that] the Soviet economy is growing faster than ours."

Mazo tells of Nixon's role as "the bayonet of Republican offensives," which provoked so much loathing among Democratic professionals. He recalls how Nixon in 1954 charged that "real Democrats are outraged by the Truman-Acheson-Stevenson gang's defense of Communism" and Nixon's further charge that Truman, Acheson and Stevenson were "traitors to the high principles in which many of the nation's Democrats believed."

WAS THIS a slick juggling of words, meant to highlight "traitor" and "Communism in high places"? Mazo asks the question, but does not answer it. He does say, however, that Nixon feels that all he did was to question the judgment of these top Democrats, not their loyalty.

Well, former President Harry S. Truman has never accepted this explanation, and it is not likely that he ever will. In a letter to the Gridiron Club in 1956, Truman said that Nixon had called him a "traitor"; therefore, he said, he would not sit down at the same table with Nixon, not even if Nixon recanted.

Mazo says that the Vice President "is a fan of Harry Truman's," and admires his courage and strong leadership in such matters as Greece-Turkish aid and the Marshall Plan and the decision to fight Communist aggression in Korea.

None of this may seem very exciting or significant. However, there are passages in the Mazo book that do add something to the political history of the Eisenhower Administration and to the Nixon story as well. A good deal of it was new and revealing to me.

Take, for example, the business of Nixon and the Vice Presidential nomination in 1952. President Eisenhower once told reporters at a press conference that Nixon was just one of many considered—that his name was on a list of Vice Presidential possibilities. The Chief Executive gave the impression that he had studied and pondered this list before deciding on Nixon.

But Mazo shows that it was all cut and dried and that others made up the General's mind for him quickly. He tells how Thomas E. Dewey and Herbert Brownell, masterminds of the Eisenhower-for-President campaign, had settled on Nixon for the No. 2 place long before the Republicans opened their 1952 convention in Chicago. Dewey notified Nixon that he was in line for the honor on May 8, which was before General Eisenhower had returned from Paris to do battle with Sen. Robert A. Taft of Ohio for the top nomination. Brownell also talked to Nixon about the Vice-Presidential nomination — at a Gridiron dinner far in advance of the 1952 convention.

Mazo quotes Brownell as saying that, after General Eisenhower had been nominated for the Presidency in Chicago, the soldier-statesman was "surprised" to learn "that the Presidential candidate could choose the Vice President as a matter of long-standing custom." Ike left it to Brownell to get the collective judgment of Republican leaders on a No. 2 man; and of course it was Nixon, the young fellow who "got Hiss."

THE bizarre story of Harold Stassen and his dump-Nixon campaign in 1956 is recounted here in detail, beefed up by many hitherto undisclosed facts. Needless to say, Mazo throws no light on Stassen's motive. He also deals with Nixon's famous expense fund in the 1952 campaign, Nixon's hope of bringing President Eisenhower and the late Sen. Joe McCarthy together, and Nixon's encounter with mobs in Latin America (of this there is entirely too much).

The author obviously thinks that

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Nixon has a good chance to be elected President in 1960 and goes into some detail in telling what Nixon would be like in the White House (the hardest-driving Chief Executive and the most controversial since Theodore Roosevelt).

Mazo, as has been said, is above all a reporter. His primary aim, I believe, has been to describe and explain Nixon, not to sell him. And since there is no such thing as complete objectivity, I think he deserves credit for a good try. His "portrait" appears at a time when Nixon is a top-heavy favorite among Republican professionals for the GOP Presidential nomination in Chicago next year —and a favorite also, it might be said, among Democratic professionals, who seem convinced that he would be easier to beat than Nelson A. Rockefeller.

A Craft and a Calling

by Irving Howe

EIGHTY-NINE reviews, 13 essays, more than 400 full pages—even the *afficionado* of literary criticism, the compulsive prowler through little magazines, might hesitate before so formidable a volume. But having come to blanch, I stayed to admire. Mr. Aiken is hardly a critic for the ages nor, thank heaven, does he write as if he thought he were; his criticism, like everyone else's, will probably be lost beneath the avalanche of still more criticism that the years inevitably bring; but as a testament of devotion, integrity and taste his book merits respect.

A Reviewer's ABC
by Conrad Aiken
(Meridian; $5)

Mr. Aiken's name does not loom large in standard accounts of American criticism, for he runs with no "school," offers no theoretical gimmick as a means of exerting "influence" over the young. He is simply a serious literary man who for 35 years, as an adjunct to writing poetry, has published essays and reviews. A few of these now seem mistaken, thin or faded; all of them shine with a love for literature and a quiet concern for standards.

In his ventures as a literary theorist Mr. Aiken is not very impressive. During the twenties and even later, when he seems to have been enticed by the charms of the *Zeitgeist,* he wrote essays in behalf of "a scientific basis for criticism." He was driven, in his search for this will-o'-the-wisp, by a recognition of the extreme relativism of judgment which dominated criticism, a relativism that no mere esthetic theorizing could subdue. Only beyond the esthetic could a new ordering principle be found, and this "basis for a scientific criticism" he declared to be psychology. Criticism, he wrote in 1922, "is really a branch of psychology"—a bit of naïveté that becomes more forgivable when one remembers the year in which it was put to paper.

As a practical critic, however, Mr. Aiken was not nearly so tempted by the coils of theory; indeed, the relativism and skepticism which he everywhere detected were also present, often fruitfully, in his own reviewing. He avoided, with the instinctive tact of the literary man, the more simple-minded exercises of the Freudian converts, and so far as I can make out, the psychological approach to literature meant for him mainly an effort to locate the total configuration, to specify the dominant bent or quality, of a writer's work. (Mr. Rufus Blanchard, in his Introduction to *A Reviewer's ABC,* suggests a somewhat different yet not entirely opposed estimate: "The separate elements of style Aiken sees as interdependent clues to a poet's . . . self-projection.") And as if in opposition to the fashion of a later decade, Mr. Aiken's psychological approach also meant a rejection of the sort of critical atomism which treats each work as a self-sufficient datum without seriously considering personal source or historical place.

It is in his reviews that Mr. Aiken proves to be a significant critic. He is better at dealing with poetry than with fiction, and best of all with American poetry. As a writer for whom the New England tradition was still a living part of his experience, he could chart those nuances of implication in the poems of Emily Dickinson or E. A. Robinson which are surely more than mere reflections of their sustaining culture but which can easily be missed by anyone not intimately familiar with it.

Though he did not engage in feats of close reading, Mr. Aiken showed a fine eye for the textural progress of a poem. Almost never indentured to a predictable scheme, his reviews are the honest, careful reports of a writer who relies, finally, upon his own sensibility—a reliance that signifies far more than a disarmed impressionism, for this is a sensibility trained by wide reading, an intense preoccupation with craft, and a willingness to submit itself to kinds of writing which ultimately it may be unable to accept.

Some of the pieces are gems of miniature criticism. There are several on Robinson which lay out, with economical detail, the directions for a full-scale study of that marvellous, neglected poet. There is a fine pioneering notice on Faulkner. And there are no less than 10 reviews on Eliot, ranging from 1916 to 1949, which comprise a remarkable series of responses *at first encounter:*— the coherence of *The Wasteland* is thoughtfully called into question and partially affirmed, a "thin and vinegarish hostility to the modern world" is noted in *For Lancelot Andrewes,* the choruses of *The Rock* are marked down for "the cunning of the rhetoric," and *Murder in the Cathedral* is praised immediately as a possible "turning point in English drama." A reviewer who can make such quick and sure discriminations needn't give a moment's thought to "the scientific basis for criticism."

The pieces are firmly written, though at times the style strikes one as too solemn, Jamesy-twisted. Mr. Aiken

The only thing that's *not* funny about this outrageous spoof on the 21st Century is that *it may be true!*

THE RISE OF THE MERITOCRACY

By MICHAEL YOUNG

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lacked the flair that a regular reviewer ought to have for swiftly changing pitch and pace, dropping into lightness or rising to anger while continuing to do his job. But he did have an enviable gift for concentrating his judgments into sharp memorable sentences.

Eliot's critical essays, wrote Mr. Aiken, are often "meticulous without being clear." In Housman's verse "simplicity is aimed at . . . but there is always, also, a little more *simplicity* than was aimed at." Carl Sandburg is "a lover of the plural." And Archibald MacLeish writes "with a sort of approximate authenticity."

Mr. Aiken's book ought to bring some encouragement to those critics who still feel—not many seem to—that reviewing is not merely part of their responsibility but often an occasion for their best work. By its very nature the review constricts the critic, but it also disciplines him and keeps him from the indulgences, pomposities and cautions which recur through too many of our critical essays.

Mr. Aiken's example ought also to put at rest the dismissal of "mere journalism" that is so frequently heard in the universities these days. Perhaps more than the flashing stars of criticism who shape the taste of the moment, it is men like Mr. Aiken who sustain the literary tradition. What may have been undertaken to win butter for his bread, he treated as a worthy craft and thereby raised to the dignity of a calling.

Russia's Pre-Marxist Radicals

by Joseph Frank

AVRAHM YARMOLINSKY, formerly head of the Slavonic Division of the New York Public Library, has performed an admirable feat of popularization of his new book on 19th-Century Russian radicalism. Taking for his theme a vast and disorderly subject, he has managed to narrate the story of the pre-Marxist Russian revolutionary movement in a simple, lucid and dramatic form. Carefully avoiding the numerous temptations to sensationalism provided particularly by the terrorist phase of the movement in the late 1870's, he maintains a balanced and objective point of view both towards the stupidities of Tsarist obscurantism and the fanatical dogmas of the radical intelligentsia. The result is an extremely readable introduction—based on the best available sources, and written in a lively and expressive style—of the road that led to the Russian revolution.

Road to Revolution
by Avrahm Yarmolinsky
(Macmillan; $5.95)

Needless to say, this road has very little resemblance to the classical Marxist blueprint. Russia had no large industrial proletariat until the middle of the 19th Century; the first industrial strikes only occurred in 1878-1879. Nineteenth-Century Russian radicalism was primarily a revolt of the intelligentsia.

Yarmolinsky accordingly begins his book with the figure of Alexander Radischev, an insignificant official in the St. Petersburg customs-house, whose travel-diary *A Journey from Petersburg to Moscow* (1790) was a passionate protest against serfdom and despotism in the best spirit of the 18th-Century Enlightenment. Like Radischev, the Russian radicals were always a small handful of isolated intellectuals set off by education from the vast grey sea of the peasantry, and inspired by Western ideas that were to remain totally alien to the people in whose name they were acting.

Indeed, the life and fate of Radischev illustrates, in a convenient microcosm, the perennial problem that the Russian monarchy was never able to solve. It was Catherine the Great who had originally sent Radischev abroad to study at the University of Leipzig; she herself had encouraged the dalliance with the Western Enlightenment that Radischev's ideas reflected. And all the energetic and ambitious Russian rulers—like Peter the Great earlier, or Alexander II after the Crimean War—found it necessary to modernize Russia after the fashion of the West in order to acquire and maintain the status of a world power. But in bringing in Western ideas, and in creating a Western-educated bureaucracy to run the state, these rulers created the very class that would some day demand a voice in the government.

The needs of the Russian state for a constantly growing educated class, combined with the obstinate refusal to accord this class any political rights, ultimately created an intolerable and explosive situation. In this respect, Radischev's fate is highly symbolic. Catherine the Great, the friend of Voltaire and Diderot, promptly locked up the insolent civil servant who had dared to question the established order in Russia; and the unhappy man, after ten years' exile in Siberia, finally committed suicide on returning to his post.

Radischev was followed by the aristocratic Decembrists, who led an abortive revolt against Nicholas I in 1825 in the hope of forcing him to grant a constitution. Both Radischev and the Decembrists still nurtured Western democratic ideals, and strove primarily to free the serfs and obtain political rights from the autocracy. The next important group of radicals in the 1840's, however, had already fallen under the spell of Utopian Socialism; and the struggle for political rights became subordinate to plans for social reorganization. The bitter Socialist criticisms of bourgeois democracy convinced the Russian radicals that democratic rights were merely a façade for capitalist exploitation. Even more, the very idea of a constitution became identified, for the majority of Russian radicals, with the hegemony of the hated bourgeoisie. It is a melancholy but highly significant fact that, from the Utopian Socialists of the 1840's to the Marxists of the 1890's, the Russian radicals were always in complete agreement with the reactionaries in denying any merits to purely political democracy.

IN THIS atmosphere, it is hardly surprising that the dominating left-wing Russian doctrine should have been a blend of Utopian Socialist and reactionary Slavophil ideas. This heady brew was concocted by the most brilliant ideologist of Russian radicalism—Alexander Herzen. Herzen became convinced, after the failure of the revolution of 1848, that Europe was spiritually incapable of breaking the shackles of her centuries-old development in the direction of personal liberty and the rights of property. This development would for-

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Cupid's Chant

CUPID is
The king of flutes.
Cupid's kiss
Wakes winter's roots.
Cupid touches
A color's curve.
Cupid reaches
Apples, peaches,
Eve and nerve.
A tutor of Venus
In the dark of the sun,
He knows and he teaches
That the clever are the stupid
For the stupid discover
How sleep and love are warm and one.

CUPID is
A student of leaves,
A scholar of tenderness,
A savant of consciousness,
And of sleep's wine-dark seas;
Of the heights of the birds
And the insides of words,
The seed within Adam,
The birth, the death, and the rebirth
Which breathes in Eve
—All that is seedy, loamy, rising, fickle, growing,
seeking, flowing, flowering, and unknowable,
all that we hope and hardly dare to believe.

DELMORE SCHWARTZ

ever hinder Europe from realizing the new collective evangel of Socialism. But the Russian peasant knew neither personal liberty nor private property. His life was circumscribed by the traditional customs of his village, and the land he cultivated was periodically re-distributed by the village commune. "With its immemorial tradition of equality," writes Yarmolinsky,

> . . . collective ownership of land and communal self-government, Herzen argued, the *obschina* [the communal system of land-holding] was in effect the seed of a socialist society. Under its aegis the simple villagers practiced in their daily living what the noblest minds of Europe only dreamed of. The *muzhik* was the man of destiny.

It was the Slavophils who had first called attention to the *obschina,* and had argued that Russian society, with all its evils, was morally purer and more just than a Europe racked by revolutions and class warfare. Herzen and the Russian radicals took over this evaluation, gave it a Socialist coloring, and emerged with the Messianic belief that Russia could leap over both the horrors of capitalist industrialization and the class-conflicts of constitutional democracy. The Russian village commune would become the foundation of the future Socialist order; the last would finally be first, not only economically but nationally, with Russia leading the way to Socialism. On the basis of this doctrine, it was also decided that the Russian peasant, despite his traditional loyalty to the Tsar, was a natural Socialist. One had only to enlighten him a bit and the old order would crumble of its own weight. In its place would spring up a series of self-governing communes whose harmonious union was assured by the inherent Russian sense of justice.

Such was the vision cherished by all the Russian radicals up through the dissolution of Populism in the 1890's. From time to time, it is true, a more realistic note was sounded in regard to means if not to ends. A Jacobin tradition of revolutionary conspiracy also runs like a dark thread through the history of Russian radicalism—a tradition which, instead of trusting to the revolutionary instincts of the masses, called for the seizure of power by determined revolutionaries.

For most of the century, however, all political problems among the radicals were settled by reference to the miraculous democratic attributes of the Russian people. Even when the Populists of the Seventies lost their faith in the masses and turned to terrorism against the Tsarist government, they never squarely faced the question of how their dream of democratic Socialism was to be realized. After the successful assassination of Alexander II in 1881, when all of Russia expected the terrorists to make some decisive move, nothing happened at all. No plan had ever been broached about what to do after killing the Tsar.

Although Yarmolinsky himself does not draw any conclusions from his excellent historical survey, at least one larger generalization about the Russian revolution seems self-evident and has recently been drawn by other students of the subject. The Russian radicals paved the way for a revolution which differs notably from the earlier bourgeois revolutions. This difference does not consist in the proletarian (or Socialist) character of the Russian revolution. Russian radicalism, as we have seen, was primarily a movement of an intellectual élite, inspired by alien (Western) ideas, and occurring in a backward agricultural country. And the effect of the Russian revolution has been to catapult Russia into the industrial age by the application of the harshest dictatorial methods. The Russian revolution has thus followed directly in the footsteps of the more ambitious Tsars, although the Communists have shown far more intelligence in giving the people at least the semblance of participation in the government. In addition, the Russian revolution has set the pattern for the colonial revolutions led by Western-educated élites now occurring all over Asia, Africa and the Near East. Herzen, who hated Communist emphasis on the importance of the state, once wrote prophetically: "Communism is Russian autocracy turned upside down." The tragedy of the 19th Century Russian radicals is that, by their scornful depreciation of political democracy, they helped to turn Herzen's *bon mot* into historical reality.

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MOVIES

From France, Old and New

JEAN RENOIR'S masterpiece, *Grand Illusion,* is now being revived, and to see it again is to discover how much we ourselves have changed. Can 1937, when it was made, really have been so long ago? Brotherhood, peace, the waste of war, how clear and final those issues once were. How poignant this film makes them seem today when every political utterance reminds us that tension is a constant in international affairs, that disarmament (for all the polite gestures made towards it) is about as tenable a concept as Moral Rearmament, that—peace to the idea of world peace—all we can hope for at present is non-war through gargantuan deterrents.

Grand Illusion
(Continental)
Lady Chatterley's Lover
(Kingsley)

Couched in terms of individual confrontation—a man with a man, rather than bloc against bloc or two hemispheres competing for outer space—*Grand Illusion* remains a towering film. By now it has attained the state of all good art that has lived some time among men: it moves us more than ever because it no longer surprises us. The blinding of Oedipus, the suicide of Anna Karenina, the last words of Saint Joan, we know they are coming and thus are additionally moved. The Athenians used old stories for their tragedies because their plays were presented at religious festivals, and to be able to foresee the end of the protagonist's life gave the audience a taste of what it was like to be a god. In this film Rauffenstein and de Boildieu and Maréchal are fated in our eyes, and from a temporary Olympus we can watch an era end.

For, of the two principal themes in the film, that one has present currency. The futility of war is no longer so manageable an issue; we are now in a struggle for survival of the species, not peace between countries. But this film, better than any I know, dramatizes the end of an era: the world of the Christian gentleman, the Europe of church and class that had governed Western history after the fall of Rome. Another world, in growth since the Reformation, is on the rise: the humanist, temporal, democratic world. It is in the First War that the two worlds pass, one declining and the other ascendant; and in this film we can see them pass.

Those of us who happen to be neither aristocrats nor devout Christians can still perceive the loss that is eulogized here. It is scarcely sentimental to recognize virtues in an opponent. The end of honor, dying all about us, and the protracted death of God (as Nietzsche predicted) are, it seems, the concomitants of modern evolution. But the loss of the nobility of one and the comfort of the other is no less disconcerting because in the process we also mitigate injustice and oppression and restriction of the mind.

Again this film reminds us how little shock there was in the Second War. The Hitlerian atrocities which preceded it and the two bombs which ended it were new experiences for the world. But the war *qua* war could not shock us greatly. Ypres and the Somme had long before destroyed pretty patriotism and the scarlet soldiery that went home with romantic scars to make the ladies gasp. By 1939 we were used to the idea of war as butchery, scientific and huge; there were no brave, lilting songs of the Second War to turn to ashes in our mouths. The millions bayoneted and blown to pieces twenty-five years earlier were too vividly remembered.

Still, even as late as 1937, it seemed a valid argument against war that a Frenchman and a German were both human beings who could, if permitted, discover their common humanity. Today we concede that fact readily; but over us all hangs the immense, iron *Nevertheless . . .*

THIS latest viewing (I have seen it six times) confirms how richly characterized and finely wrought *Grand Illusion* is. Though it is long and meaty, it is an aggregate of understatements, not explications. Examples: the lonesome silence which descends on the prisoners preparing for the camp show when one of their number appears for the first time in female wig and dress. Or the scene in which Gabin, raving after solitary confinement, rushes out of his cell. A lesser director would have followed him into the corridor and shown him being subdued; Renoir has us wait with his patient, round-shouldered guard until Gabin is carried back in. Or Fresnay's death scene. Stroheim converses briefly with him at his bedside, then goes over and takes a drink. The nurse calls him softly. Stroheim hesitates, then takes another drink. (It is the second drink that makes the scene.) Then he turns and goes to the nurse. She looks at her watch and jots down the time on her chart, then clamps off the infusion tube. We have not seen Fresnay die, but we have felt it.

It is a beautiful work, now doubly sad. It is strange that, except for parts of *The River,* Renoir's subsequent work has not come near it.

IN NEW YORK, until this month, you could read the unabridged *Lady Chatterley's Lover* but you could not see the film. In England you can see the film but you cannot obtain the book.

And what is this film which needed Supreme Court action to release it in New York? Made in France, it claims to be set in England; but it is an England full of French houses and streets, in whose pubs the workers stand around with glasses of *vin rouge,* and where the cars bear French plates. To complicate matters further, Clifford is played by Leo Genn, an Englishman and a good actor reduced to incompetence by his struggles with a foreign language.

There is nothing in the film to distress an intelligent high-school girl, although I cannot promise that she will be entertained. Lawrence's novel becomes here the story of a somewhat tired lovely woman (Danielle Darrieux) who, to judge by the way she handles men, has had dozens of lovers and who is now married to a power-mad cripple. She embarks, pensively rather than passionately, on an affair with her husband's gamekeeper in a full flood of Gallic *tristesse.* When he is convinced that she wants him, not just his siring services, they go off together.

Because it is so wrongly flavored and so distorted, both its resemblances to and its differences from Lawrence's novel make this film just another plodding French sex drama.

STANLEY KAUFFMANN

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RECORDS

A Vocal Miscellany

COLUMBIA 03L-260 offers the New York City Opera's performance of *Regina,* the opera Marc Blitzstein made of Lillian Hellman's play *The Little Foxes.* In one of the statements in the accompanying booklet Miss Hellman expresses her admiration for what Mr. Blitzstein made of her play with his music; and this surprises me, for I would have thought she would be troubled by what his music does to the scene near the end in which Regina backs her rapacious financial demands with threats of exposure of her brothers' theft. Not having seen the original Hellman play I can only surmise that Ben's reply may have been a mock-reproachful "Greedy girl!" which left the continuity and tension of the scene unbroken. But in the opera his reply is *Greedy Girl,* a song with the amusingly rhymed lyric and the musical style, the expressive connotations and tone, of a humorous musical-comedy song, which breaks the dramatic continuity and tension and establishes a musical-comedy atmosphere in which the melodrama becomes unreal. And if in the original play the guests at the party whispered bitter and nasty remarks about Regina and her brothers the dramatic situation had a sense and tone very different from what it has in the opera, where the guests sing a cleverly rhymed musical-comedy-style chorus that makes fun of—and out of—the situation. Even a serious piece like Alexandra's *What Will It Be for Me* has the style, and therefore the expressive connotations and tone, of a musical-comedy song, whose underlying assumption is that it is something not to take seriously. I would, then, have thought Miss Hellman would be troubled by the considerable part of *Regina* that is an American musical—not because there is anything wrong in Blitzstein's writing an American musical (on the contrary, it is what he should write because it is what he has a gift for), but because there is something wrong in his writing one as a setting of her melodrama.

Nor should Miss Hellman be happy about the part of Blitzstein's opera that is not American musical. He is able to work up the musical frenzy for Regina's *If You Want,* the feverish, distorted waltz for her *Do You Wish We Had Wed Years Ago* (which has some of the worst verbiage ever set to music); but the inadequacy of his musical imagination and invention for the expressive requirements of other characters and situations is evident in Birdie's short aria in Act 1 and her long one in Act 3. The inadequacy is evident also in the fact that much of the time the characters speak instead of singing, and that the words usually gain nothing when they are sung in Blitzstein's recitative or arioso. But that, I think I should mention, is not the way Leonard Bernstein hears it: in his statement in the booklet, in which he speaks of various masterly, fascinating and ravishing details which my ear can't discover in Blitzstein's opera, he concludes: "The words sing themselves, so to speak. The result is true song—a long, flexible, pragmatic, dramatic song."

Brenda Lewis' italicized singing and screaming achieve completely the unbelievable caricature that Regina is in this opera; and there is good singing by Elizabeth Carron, Carol Brice, George Irving and Loren Driscoll; but Helen Strine's wobbly soprano and Joshua Hecht's hoarse bass are disadvantageous to the performance conducted efficiently by Samuel Krachmalnick.

In *Juno,* on Columbia OL-5380, Blitzstein hasn't undertaken to set the situations of comedy and pathos of O'Casey's *Juno and the Paycock* to expressively suitable music, but has used the situations for the lyrics and songs of a musical comedy. Those lyrics and songs —sung effectively by Shirley Booth, Melvyn Douglas, Monte Amundsen, Jack McGowran and others of the Broadway cast—are good; but one's enjoyment of them is lessened by the recollection of what was in the O'Casey play

Notes on Contributors

EDWARD T. FOLLIARD is on the editorial staff of *The Washington Post and Times-Herald.* JOSEPH FRANK is a member of the English Faculty of the University of Minnesota. DELMORE SCHWARTZ is the author of a new book of poems to be published next month.

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at each point, and by the thought of what a monstrous idea it was to turn the great play into a series of musical-comedy jokes, with an incongruous conclusion in Juno's anguished *Where?* (more powerful in the O'Casey play than with the mellifluous Blitzstein phrase for the words "Take away our hearts of stone . . . ") and the swelling chorus of affirmation which the newer and higher musicals—the ones that have Voltaire and O'Casey as their co-authors—end with these days.

On Angel 35763 Maria Callas sings—in addition to arias from Verdi's *Nabucco* and *Ernani* and the great *"Tu che le vanita"* from *Don Carlo*—the arias *"Vieni! t'affretta!"* and *"La luce langue"* and the Sleepwalking Scene from *Macbeth,* thus giving us an idea of her performance in this opera that Mr. Bing prevented us from hearing at the Metropolitan last season. The deterioration in the upper range of her voice has continued to the point where the unpleasantly wobbly and shrill tones are sometimes indeterminate in pitch; but in its lower range the strange-timbred voice is beautiful and affecting and her expressive inflection of phrase is powerful. This describes most of the performances on the record; but concerning the *Nabucco* I will add that her delicate singing in a quiet section is breathtaking in tone and phrasing, and concerning the Sleepwalking Scene I must report that I find the tempo over-deliberate and the expressive inflection in the early portion overdone to the point of hamming.

The beautiful lyric tenor voice and distinguished musical taste and style of Tito Schipa have given me much pleasure in the old performances dubbed onto Scala 847, especially in the electrically recorded *"Una furtiva lagrima"* from *L'Elisir d'Amore* and *"Questa o quella"* from *Rigoletto,* but also in the acoustically recorded ones. And I have had pleasure also from the remarkable voice and superb singing of the tenor Leo Slezak in the performances—a couple of them electrically recorded, the rest acoustically—of arias and a few songs, including Mozart's *Das Veilchen* and Schumann's *Die Lotosblume,* on Scala 844. Scala 842 has the fine earlier baritone of Friedrich Schorr in performances, mostly acoustically recorded, of operatic excerpts which include an extensive one from Weber's *Euryanthe* that is unfamiliar and interesting, and Schubert's *Aus Heliopolis* and *Im Abendrot,* which are sung beautifully. And Scala 846 has the beautiful singing of Nellie Melba in several performances that are also on Rococo 17, which reproduces her voice with a little more brightness, color and presence, and which has a fine performance of the *"Ave Maria"* from *Otello* that is not on the Scala record.

B. H. HAGGIN

"MOREANDMORE *it is confirmed that Liberal intellectuals were permanently cretinized by the McCarthy experience, and are incapable of historical fidelity to the facts, let alone soundness of judgment. We are interested in doing justice by Senator McCarthy: in admitting his faults, but also in proclaiming his insights. But, the rehabilitation that is his due is less urgently needed—we are prepared to concede—than coping with the paralysis of the critical faculties of so many of our leading scholars and publicists."*

From the current issue of NATIONAL REVIEW. Write to Dept. N—1, 150 E. 35 St., New York 16, N. Y., for free copy.

Correspondence

(Continued from page 3)

Furcolo's senatorial candidacy that year was designed to keep McCarthy in his committee chairmanship. The fact is that many liberal Democrats in Massachusetts in 1954 declined to support Furcolo precisely because he showed so many signs of yielding to the McCarthyite clamor—as in his celebrated attack on ADA, for example, or in his interview with Edgar M. Mills of *The Christian Science Monitor* on December 17, 1953, when Furcolo said that, while he didn't know enough about McCarthy's methods to take a position on them, he would say that McCarthy had alerted the nation to "the danger of international Communism" and that "the attitude of all candidates toward Communism and subversion should be an issue [in 1954]." Furcolo was not, of course, a McCarthyite, only a Massachusetts politician prepared to appease the McCarthyites; but I hardly see that Kennedy's failure to support him with enthusiasm can be construed as a pro-McCarthy act!

Mr. Horan's letter raises larger and graver issues. A number of Democrats are competing for the Presidential nomination in 1960. These candidates are all honorable men. Some of them—and I would unhesitatingly include Kennedy in this group—are liberals. Since they are Democrats, the competition among them will be vigorous and hard-hitting. What is essential both for liberalism and the Democratic Party is that this competition remain clean. Nothing would help American conservatism more than for the supporters of each liberal candidate to try to destroy his rivals through smear and innuendo. There may be short-run temptations in dirty politics; the long-run effect will be to corrupt our national political discourse; and, if this is done, liberals will lose more than anyone else. People have a right to disagree about Kennedy's qualifications for the nomination; but to imply that he was ever an adherent of or a fellow-traveler of McCarthy is a prime example of dirty play.

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.
Harvard University

► *Proletarian Snobbery*

SIRS:

IN the process of accusing Jacques Barzun of snobbery, your reviewer ("Education for an Elite", by T. J. Ross, *NR,* July 13) had to ignore nine tenths of Mr. Barzun's book. His own review, on the other hand, was ALL snobbery—proletarian snobbery. And this is THE snobbery of our age that remains a serious menace to society as a whole.

ERIC BENTLEY
New York, N.Y.

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